[10 Years Since Sewol] Checking Passenger IDs and Thorough Safety Briefings... Boarding the Ship Directly at Incheon Port

①Significantly Improved Ship Safety
Thorough Identity Verification Conducted Twice
Easy-to-Understand Safety Video Playback

Editor's NoteThe Sewol ferry disaster, in which 304 people including students from Ansan Danwon High School who were on a school trip died or went missing, marks its 10th anniversary on April 16. Over a decade, the yellow ribbon pledge of "We will not forget" has continued, embodying the public's hope for a safer society. Although awareness, policies, and systems regarding safety have changed significantly since then, voices calling for further improvements remain. Asia Economy examines the changes in our society brought about by the Sewol ferry disaster and the ongoing efforts to remember the victims in a three-part series.

"Please show your ID." "ID check, please."

At around 7:40 a.m. on the 9th, one week before the 10th anniversary of the Sewol ferry disaster, at the Incheon Port Coastal Passenger Terminal located in Jung-gu, Incheon, passengers boarding the ferry 'Korea King' bound for Daeyeonpyeongdo had to go through two rounds of identity verification: when purchasing tickets and just before boarding. At the boarding gate, 4 to 5 safety personnel were meticulously checking passengers' identities.

Safety personnel are verifying passengers' identities before they board the ferry.
[Photo by Seom Seong-ah]

Passenger Safety Management from Boarding to Overall Operation

The scene was markedly different from 10 years ago. In 2014, identity verification of passengers was done in a haphazard manner, making it difficult to confirm who had boarded in the event of an accident. Since July 2015, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries improved the system to require two rounds of identity verification (ticketing and boarding). Additionally, all ferry operators were mandated to record passenger information such as gender and date of birth when issuing tickets at ticket counters.

At 8 a.m., as the ferry departed for Daeyeonpyeongdo, a video titled 'Safety Rules and Emergency Procedures' played on the onboard monitors.

"In case of an emergency requiring evacuation from the ferry, alarm signals and announcements will be made. Upon hearing the alarm, immediately take out your life jacket, put it on starting from your head, then connect the clips around your waist and chest, pull the straps tight or tie them securely so the jacket fits snugly."

The safety announcement was loud enough for all passengers inside the cabin to hear, and the video demonstrated how to respond in emergencies, making it easy for passengers to understand from their perspective.

As the ship departed, a video titled 'Safety Rules and Emergency Procedures' began playing on the onboard monitor.
[Photo by Sim Seong-ah]

Having boarded the ferry myself, I could feel the improved safety measures from the boarding process through actual operation. Although the ferry was smaller than the Sewol and did not carry vehicles, so overloading could not be checked, passenger safety was clearly better compared to 10 years ago. It was also difficult to detect any anxiety on passengers' faces.

Strengthened Safety Management through Introduction of Managers and Supervisors

Although awareness of ship safety has increased since the Sewol disaster, dangers still lurk at sea. According to the Korea Coast Guard's 'Ship Accident Status in the West Sea Region,' a total of 9,737 ship accidents occurred in the West Sea region over the past 10 years (figures for 2023?2024 are provisional). These accidents resulted in 583 deaths and missing persons. There can be no compromise on safety.

The government has strengthened passenger ferry management and supervision by appointing ship operation managers who conduct joint safety inspections with captains before departure and require that any defects be corrected before sailing. These operation managers thoroughly check communication and navigation equipment, boarding passes, life-saving equipment, overloading and securing of cargo, cargo distribution, and vehicle placement. Additionally, a maritime safety supervisor system was introduced, allowing safety supervisors to conduct frequent inspections throughout the operation and of the vessel itself.

Enhanced Ship Management System and Related Legislation

During the Sewol disaster, issues such as cargo overloading, poor securing (fixing cargo to the hull), and ballast water manipulation were revealed. To prevent cargo overloading, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries mandated computerized ticketing for vehicles and cargo starting in October 2014, with automatic suspension of ticket issuance if loading limits are exceeded.

The Sewol was an old vessel built in 1994 at a Japanese shipyard. As problems with the aging hull and illegal modifications surfaced, the National Assembly amended the Ship Safety Act. Shipowners must now undergo inspections by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries when modifying passenger cabins or other areas. A ministry official stated, "After the Sewol accident, the age limit for vessels was tightened from 30 years to 25 years, and modifications that worsen stability are completely prohibited during the approval process, including blueprint inspections."

Rust is visible on the Sewol ferry docked at Mokpo New Port. [Image source=Yonhap News]

Expansion of Distress Systems and Control Towers

The Coast Guard's inadequate initial response, which was criticized for worsening the damage during the Sewol accident, has also been improved. Satellite communication networks, previously installed only on 72 vessels over 250 tons, were extended in the second half of 2014 to 30 small patrol boats of 100 tons, such as the 123-class patrol boats. This communication network allows real-time transmission of maritime accident scenes to the situation center, which can issue instructions to vessels while viewing video footage.

Furthermore, from November 2015 to early January 2020, the Coast Guard replaced the low-earth orbit satellite distress system with a medium-earth orbit satellite distress system in three phases. This reduced location errors from 5 km to within a few meters, eliminated time errors of about an hour, and enabled real-time position calculation.

At the time of the accident, there was no disaster rescue control tower, and command institutions such as the Coast Guard Rescue Headquarters, Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters, Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries Central Accident Response Headquarters, and Countermeasure Headquarters were dispersed, causing confusion such as mixed-up lists of rescued persons. Subsequently, the Framework Act on Disaster and Safety Management was amended so that in the event of a major accident, the Prime Minister, not a minister, serves as the head of the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters to lead the response.