[Yang Nak-gyu's Defence Club] North Korea Likely to Use Seongdonggyeokseo-Style Provocation Instead of NLL

Increase in NLL Fishing Boats... Likely to Avoid Provocations During Flower Crab Season
Nuclear Tests, Cyber Attacks, Drone Intrusions, and Other Possibilities

There is an analysis that North Korea is preparing for a Seongdong-gyeokseo-style provocation. Following consecutive coastal artillery firings toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea since the New Year, it is expected that various tactical and strategic provocations may be carried out.

[Image source=Yonhap News]

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According to military officials on the 11th, “When North Korea fired artillery near the West Sea NLL from the 5th to the 7th, there were only one or two fishing boats, but recently the number of fishing boats has increased to about ten,” and “As the March crab season approaches, coastal artillery firing will practically become impossible, so other provocations are expected,” they said.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik also stated in an interview with the media, “North Korea may carry out provocations that are difficult to predict, similar to the Cheonan incident, or direct military provocations whose perpetrators are hard to identify, in connection with the South Korean general election,” adding, “There is also a possibility of causing social chaos through large-scale hacking using various means such as social networking services (SNS).”

Possibility of Large-Scale Hacking Targeting Inter-Korean Conflict Before General Election

The military is reportedly reviewing countermeasures by assuming various provocation scenarios that North Korea could carry out. After launching the ICBM Hwasong-18 on the 18th of last month, Kim Jong-un reportedly instructed his close aides to “prepare measures that could cause a major impact in South Korea early next year.” The disclosure of special intelligence (SI) level information on North Korea indicates that the types of provocations could exceed expectations.

Among North Korea’s provocation scenarios, there is also the possibility of testing tactical nuclear warheads or super-large nuclear warhead explosions. The military believes that tunnels 3 and 4 at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province, where nuclear tests have not yet been conducted, are prepared for nuclear testing at any time. In March, when Kim Jong-un visited the nuclear weapons research institute, North Korea unveiled a tactical nuclear warhead named ‘Hwasan-31.’ North Korea claims that the Hwasan-31 can be mounted on more than ten types of weapons, including the 600mm super-large multiple rocket launcher (KN-25), unmanned underwater attack vehicle Haeil, Hwasal-1 and 2 cruise missiles, KN-24 (ATACMS), and mini submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

[Image source=Yonhap News]

Estimated to have a diameter of 40 to 50 cm and a yield of around 10 kt (kiloton; 1 kt equals the explosive power of 1,000 tons of TNT), the Hwasan-31 is presumed to be standardized to fit into the warhead section of delivery systems. However, it is still uncertain whether it is reliable as an actual weapon.

Additional nuclear tests for warhead production are also possible. The possibility of nuclear testing for the production of super-large nuclear warheads, one of the ‘top five priority tasks in the strategic weapons sector’ presented by Kim Jong-un in January 2021, has been consistently raised. North Korea conducted six nuclear tests from October 2006 to September 2017, with the 3rd to 6th tests occurring during Kim Jong-un’s rule. The explosive yields increased progressively: 6-7 kt (3rd), 6 kt (4th), 10 kt (5th), and 50 kt (6th). If a super-large nuclear warhead explosion test is conducted, it is expected that the yield would be two to three times that of the 6th test.

ICBM Normal Angle Launch and 7th Nuclear Test Cannot Be Ruled Out

Test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and new solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) are also possible. Earlier, the Ministry of National Defense stated at the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee plenary session on the 21st of last month that North Korea is expected to demonstrate its capability to strike the U.S. mainland with various ICBMs using liquid and solid fuels.

Additionally, there is a possibility of low-intensity provocations aimed at causing confusion in South Korean society and dividing public opinion. Cyberattacks targeting public infrastructure systems such as financial networks, dissemination of fake news, and unmanned aerial vehicle intrusions are also low-intensity provocation scenarios. The military is preparing for provocations that are difficult to immediately trace back to their origin.

The National Intelligence Service is paying attention to the appointments of Kim Yong-chol, who led the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island provocations, as an advisor to the United Front Department in June, and Ri Yong-gil and Pak Jong-chon, who directed the DMZ landmine provocations, as Chief of the General Staff and Director of the Military Guidance Department respectively in August.

The South Korean and U.S. military authorities also plan to respond with military demonstrations such as deploying strategic assets and counter-fire against ballistic missiles if North Korea provokes, so military tensions on the Korean Peninsula are expected to continue into the new year.

Shin Jong-woo, Secretary General of the Korea Defense and Security Forum, said, “North Korea is trying to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula through deceptive propaganda, GP restoration, and artillery firing drills,” adding, “We must be vigilant against Seongdong-gyeokseo-style provocations aimed at maximizing shock effects against the South through surprise attacks before the general election.”