Even if guided missiles are developed, the guided missile detector remains a problem
Unreasonable conditions must be resolved for additional F-35 procurement
Our military has invested about 7.3 trillion won to significantly strengthen the Korean-style 3-axis system power, but there are many challenges that need to be addressed.
According to the Ministry of National Defense on the 14th, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) held the 150th Defense Acquisition Program Promotion Committee meeting the day before and processed five agenda items totaling 7.31 trillion won in project costs, including the second purchase plan for the next-generation fighter (F-X) and the basic system development plan for the ‘Fleet Air Defense Missile-II project’.
The Fleet Air Defense Missile-II project is a program to develop and mass-produce domestically guided missiles that intercept enemy aircraft and missiles, to be mounted on the Korean next-generation destroyer (KDDX). The Fleet Air Defense Missile-II is understood as a concept to replace the U.S.-made Fleet Air Defense SM-2 missiles currently operated by the military. It is called Type II because its operational purpose and concept are similar to the SM-2, and a separate name may be assigned upon completion of development. The project will proceed until 2030, with a total project cost of 690 billion won including mass production.
Even if the guided missiles are developed domestically, the missile seeker remains a problem. The missile seeker is a device that guides missiles launched from naval vessels to their targets and is considered a core component in operating interceptor missiles. The Navy has imported missile seekers from the U.S. since 2004, but since 2018, due to retirements of maintenance personnel and facility closures, maintenance has become impossible.
Last July, the Navy’s Munmu the Great-class destroyer participated in the multinational joint maritime exercise ‘Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)’ and test-fired one SM-2 missile to intercept a North Korean ballistic missile but failed. The missile seeker malfunctioned, causing the missile to fail to locate the target and self-destruct in midair.
Due to the U.S. company’s cessation of maintenance, 215 out of 502 seeker items (42%) on the Gwanggaeto the Great-class DDH-I and 102 out of 208 items (49%) on the Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin-class DDH-II have been discontinued. According to military officials, parts were patched up by rotating components between ships.
Because of this, the Navy’s SM-2 hit rate (70%) is lower than that of the U.S. Navy (75%). Currently, the Navy holds about 400 SM-2 missiles, but unless the fundamental problem with the missile seeker is resolved, the hit rate cannot be guaranteed.
Additionally, as part of strengthening the Korean-style 3-axis system, including missions to covertly strike North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities in emergencies, the military has decided to procure additional F-35A aircraft. The acquisition will proceed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) method, with plans to spend about 3.75 trillion won to acquire approximately 20 units by 2028. This will increase the military’s F-35A fleet to about 60 units.
However, the F-35A cannot fire live rounds from its cannon until this year. The cannon ammunition (PGU-48) equipped on the F-35A has not been certified, so only training rounds can be fired.
The U.S. side notified in December 2015, at the time of the F-35A stealth fighter contract, that live ammunition certification had not been completed and only training rounds could be used. However, even by March 2018, when the first unit was introduced, live ammunition certification was not completed. Ultimately, DAPA only procured 55,100 training rounds in May 2020. This was why the F-35A did not load live rounds when deployed during North Korea’s show of force with 150 military aircraft on the 8th of last month.
Currently, firing live rounds from the cannon mounted on the F-35A stealth fighter causes cracks that degrade stealth capabilities. For this reason, the U.S. side has advised F-35A operating countries not to use the cannon until certification is completed by the end of next year. Although the F-35A is deployed for mid-range attacks, cannon fire is essential in close combat with enemy aircraft. Training rounds used in wartime exercises lack penetration power and are practically ineffective weapons.
Many unresolved issues remain. During the first phase of the next-generation fighter (F-X) procurement, Lockheed Martin was supposed to support military communication satellite development, but there have been persistent allegations that the company unilaterally terminated the contract.
The military selected the U.S. F-35A fighter in the first phase of the next-generation fighter (F-X) project. As part of offset trade (where the exporting country provides benefits such as technology transfer to the importing country), the Ministry of National Defense was to receive support from Lockheed Martin for the development of five military communication satellites.
According to the contract, Lockheed Martin was to support the military’s satellite launch project by providing about 400 billion won to Airbus, which is developing the launch vehicle. However, Lockheed Martin unilaterally notified the suspension of the project, citing inability to bear the satellite project costs alone, and the related project was ultimately halted in August 2015.
There are suspicions that when DAPA decided to relaunch the military communication satellite project, which was on the verge of suspension, it signed a third amended Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Lockheed Martin. The problem lies in the MOA’s content. The MOA reportedly waived a 30 billion won penalty for delayed offset trade and stipulated that the price reduction of the F-35 airframe, to be decided in 2020, would be used for satellite production costs. Ultimately, this means that not only was the penalty waived in violation of regulations, but the military communication satellites, which should have been received free of charge, are effectively being purchased at cost.
While considering the additional procurement of F-35A, DAPA reviewed the option of introducing U.S. technology through offset trade, but decided not to pursue offset trade due to uncertainties about the total increased project cost and whether the desired technology could be obtained.
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