[100 Days Since Itaewon Tragedy]② US Managed 9/11 Trauma for 10 Years... Need for Disaster Investigation Agency

Basic Data for Preventing Recurrence of Disaster 'Survivors'
Survivors and Bereaved Families Excluded from Government Investigation
Recurrence Prevention Measures Only in Chapter 7 of 710-Page Report

"The biggest difference from my common sense is that in such a national investigation or in the policymaking related to it, the bereaved families, victims, or people from the affected communities are not present. They are absolutely necessary to understand what we can learn from this disaster and to prepare for the next one."

This was a point raised at the expert public hearing of the National Assembly's national investigation into the Itaewon disaster. Survivors and bereaved families are secondary victims of the disaster. Especially in large-scale disasters like the Itaewon tragedy, collecting testimonies and data from them should be the first priority to prevent recurrence.

However, even after this disaster, the voices of survivors and bereaved families were thoroughly excluded. The only time the bereaved families could testify in the National Assembly was during the second public hearing, which was held after all on-site investigations, institutional reports, and hearings had been completed.

The bereaved families were not allowed to directly participate in the national investigation process. They requested to join the on-site investigation on December 21 of last year, the first scheduled date, but it was unsuccessful. They were not allowed to enter the Itaewon Police Station and were even expelled from the Yongsan District Office's closed-circuit television (CCTV) integrated control center. The reason given was the Personal Information Protection Act. According to Article 17, Paragraph 1 of this law, public institutions must provide personal information if it is unavoidable for the performance of their duties.

During the hearing process, the bereaved families were also ignored. The bereaved families, who were suffering secondary harm, demanded participation in the national investigation. However, they were not allowed to attend the hearing and had to vent their frustration from the observers' seats. During the persistent questioning by People Power Party lawmaker Jo Su-jin regarding the Doctor Car controversy, the bereaved families protested vehemently outside the meeting room, and Jo made a controversial remark saying, "You're on the same side as the Democratic Party." Minister Lee Sang-min, who is responsible for disaster management, did not attend the national investigation session where the bereaved families were present.

As the national investigation became mired in political strife, the trauma of survivors and bereaved families was not properly addressed. The content dealing with support for bereaved families and injured persons in the second institutional report was only three pages long. This number reflects the level of interest from both ruling and opposition parties in the national investigation. On December 12 last year, a high school student who survived the Itaewon disaster took an extreme step due to trauma, but only six witnesses were called to the hearing, including Minister Cho Kyu-hong of the Ministry of Health and Welfare and Shim Min-young, head of the National Trauma Center at the National Mental Health Center. Trauma was covered in only one page in the comprehensive opinion section of the final report. Even that was limited to broad mentions such as "providing continuous psychological counseling" and "firm measures against secondary perpetrators at the police level." This contrasts sharply with the four pages devoted to drug crimes in the comprehensive opinion section.

Will 'Another Disaster' Really Not Happen?

[Image source=Yonhap News]

Out of the 710-page report, the section on 'Measures to Prevent Recurrence' (pages 638?645) is only seven pages long. Even when combined with the following section on 'Follow-up Measures for Victims and Bereaved Families' (pages 646?650), it barely exceeds ten pages. In terms of content, it is briefly divided into four areas: ▲eliminating blind spots in safety management ▲improving reporting and cooperation systems ▲strengthening disaster site response ▲enhancing basic safety management capabilities of local governments.

The section containing the reports used during the expert public hearing (pages 658?716) had substantial data but was merely a compilation of materials organized by each expert who participated in the hearing. Notably, although the materials were publicly available to all citizens, many parts were written only in English or lacked explanations of technical terms.

In the actual national investigation process, an expert public hearing to discuss recurrence prevention measures was held on the 10th of last month, leaving about a week before the 55-day investigation period ended. One week was far too short a time to discuss delicate and systematic alternatives. The investigation period was initially short, and the investigation could not start for about a month at the beginning of the national investigation due to the National Assembly budget agreement.

The physical limitations were clearly evident even during the expert public hearing. A staff member from a lawmaker's office involved in scheduling the special committee said, "Because the ruling and opposition parties could not agree on a third hearing involving the bereaved families, we had to hastily schedule the expert public hearing," adding, "The experts participating in the meeting were also selected in a hurry." During the hearing, experts from various fields presented their diagnoses, but there was only a brief question-and-answer session, and no comprehensive conclusions were reached through discussions with the special committee members.

During the hearing's questioning, many questions focused on confirming the situation on the day of the disaster, while very few addressed future improvement measures. The witnesses' answers were limited to statements like "We will improve further."

Professor Cha Ji-ho, an international health expert at KAIST who attended the expert public hearing, explained that a separate 'permanent investigation body' is ultimately necessary to prepare measures to prevent recurrence. He said, "Creating a system to prevent disasters is not something that can be achieved through just a few weeks of a national investigation," adding, "Other countries conduct such investigations for one to two years, and in the case of the United States, health impact assessments for victims and survivors of the 9/11 terror attack have been ongoing for over 20 years, with budgets allocated for decades to come." He emphasized, "Creating an independent permanent investigation body to continuously investigate and research will be an opportunity to prevent repeating other disasters."

Professor Kim Jeong-han of Ulsan University College of Medicine pointed out that unlike the police manual, during the Itaewon disaster, the deceased were temporarily placed in a gymnasium for identification and then dispersed to mortuaries in the metropolitan area, causing mental distress to the bereaved families. He urged the enactment of a coroner or medical examiner law.