[Column] Has Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Been Too Eager to Hide the 'Power Outage Incident'?

Power Outage at Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Headquarters for 10 Hours Due to Typhoon 'Hinnamnor' Last September
Main Ministry Unaware of Outage... Allegations of Incident Downplay and Concealment Raised

Panoramic view of the Gori Nuclear Power Plant located in Gijang-gun, Busan.
[Photo by Asia Economy DB]

[Asia Economy Sejong=Reporter Lee Jun-hyung] It was revealed belatedly that the headquarters of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) experienced a power outage for 10 hours on September 6 due to Typhoon Hinamno. At that time, the operation of KHNP's Information and Communication Technology (ICT) center was halted, paralyzing the entire internal work system. In effect, the KHNP headquarters, which serves as the command tower for the 24 nuclear power plants operating domestically, was down for nearly half a day.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the supervising ministry, was unaware of this fact. The ministry maintained a 24-hour emergency work system from September 2 to 8 in preparation for Typhoon Hinamno's approach. Nevertheless, the work report from the ministry’s comprehensive situation room on the day of the power outage recorded the KHNP inspection results as "no abnormalities." The "Hinamno Damage Report Status" compiled by the ministry after the typhoon also contains no information related to the KHNP headquarters power outage.

This has raised suspicions that the KHNP power outage incident was downplayed or concealed. The ministry’s Hinamno damage report states that aside from power outages at two affiliated institutions, including the Korea Gas Corporation Busan-Gyeongnam branch, there were no damages to subordinate agencies. It is reported that KHNP initially emphasized "tight-lipped" measures immediately after the power outage incident. This is why, in our investigation, there were internal reactions within KHNP such as "we thought it would be buried."

KHNP maintains the position that there was no direct financial damage caused by the headquarters power outage. However, the problem lies in the fact that KHNP failed to prevent the accident despite issuing a B-level disaster alert the day before the headquarters power outage. It took 10 hours to restore power and communication facilities at the headquarters after they went down. This indicates a vulnerability in KHNP headquarters’ disaster response system.

What remains is follow-up action. If the headquarters experienced a power outage due to a typhoon, it is appropriate to accurately identify the cause and reinforce the disaster response system. Trying to cover up the power outage fact does not help prevent similar accidents from recurring. It is also necessary to clarify why this incident was not properly reported to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. No citizen would be lenient in accepting that the government failed to recognize a power outage incident at the nuclear power control tower.