What '99% Probability' Prevented Nuclear War... Lessons from the 'Cuban Missile Crisis' [Books in the News]

Serhiy Plohy <Nuclear War Crisis>
How the 'Cuban Missile Crisis,' a Nuclear War Brinkmanship, Was Overcome

[Asia Economy Reporter Kang Juhee] Nuclear war is making headlines. The thought that it may not be a distant event heightens the sense of crisis. The situation where a retreating Russia openly declares it might use nuclear weapons signals the collapse of global leadership. Will Russia actually use nuclear weapons? If so, what will happen afterward? In a state where no one can predict the future with certainty, a noteworthy book is (Sam-in Publishing), which deals with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

In history, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is mentioned as the situation with the highest possibility of nuclear war since World War II. Even after the war ended, the ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union continued, and their power struggle unfolded in Cuba, very close to the United States. The U.S. was displeased that Fidel Castro, who came to power through revolution, adopted a socialist path. The Soviet Union felt threatened by the fact that the Jupiter missiles deployed by the U.S. in Italy and T?rkiye (Turkey) could attack Moscow at any time. Therefore, the Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba within striking distance of the U.S. mainland.

The sharp conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached the brink of nuclear disaster but was narrowly averted when both sides agreed to withdraw their missile bases. What prevented a nuclear war with a 99% probability? The nonfiction book emphasizes that in the current context, where the possibility of nuclear weapon use is being discussed in the 2022 Ukraine war and North Korea’s nuclear threats are intensifying, we must look back at the crisis from 60 years ago.

The book’s author, Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy, based on recently uncovered KGB documents, examines the decision-making processes of key figures from both countries during the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the little-known Soviet military mobilization process. Plokhy explains that contrary to the existing interpretation that the crisis was resolved by "Kennedy’s correct judgment and decisiveness toward the Soviet Union," in reality, both sides repeatedly misunderstood and misread each other’s intentions and objectives, making mistakes.

For example, when the U.S. considered a preemptive strike on the Soviet base in Cuba, it underestimated the actual number of Soviet troops and nuclear capabilities. However, according to testimony from Anatoly Gribkov, a key planner of Soviet military operations in Cuba, there were massive Soviet forces and missiles equipped with nuclear warheads deployed in Cuba that the U.S. was unaware of. Robert McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defense under the Kennedy administration, was reportedly shocked when he later learned this fact. If the U.S. had not backed down and invaded Cuba, nuclear war could have become a reality.

Plokhy points out that on August 2, 2019, when the U.S. and Russia declared their withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in 1987, the world faced a renewed nuclear war crisis. Despite witnessing the Ukraine war and North Korea’s military provocations, humanity has "forgotten the lessons of the past" when nuclear weapons threatened mankind, according to Plokhy’s diagnosis. To avoid experiencing a nuclear war crisis again, the author emphasizes the need to "look back at the past and return to the negotiating table."