[Yang Nak-gyu's Defence Club] The Realism of Russia's Use of Nuclear Weapons

Russia Directly Mentions Its Most Powerful Strategic Nuclear Weapon Recently
Possibility of Nuclear Use for Counterattack if Reserve Mobilization Order Becomes Ineffective

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] Interest in nuclear weapons is rising as Russian President Vladimir Putin, cornered by Ukraine's counteroffensive, hinted at the possibility of using nuclear weapons. President Putin, who insisted that the invasion of Ukraine was not a war but a 'special military operation,' has effectively declared an escalation against the West beyond Ukraine. Additionally, as the nuclear crisis intensifies, assessments suggest that the Ukraine war has reached a critical turning point.

According to foreign media, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, stated on Telegram, "We can use any weapons, including strategic nuclear weapons, to defend Russian territory, including the newly annexed occupied areas."

Nuclear weapons are divided into strategic and tactical types. Strategic nuclear weapons are used with the intent to end a war with a hostile country. Even a single strike has the power to destroy a major city. If a war involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons occurs, a third world war would be inevitable. This is why strategic nuclear weapons are called 'unusable weapons.' Russia's mention of strategic nuclear weapons is interpreted as a response to Western speculation about the possible use of relatively less powerful tactical nuclear weapons by referring to a more powerful weapon.

Furthermore, Russia's mention of nuclear weapons is also interpreted as a judgment that the mobilization order for reservists may effectively end up being useless. Russia's announcement of the mobilization order is the first since World War II. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that 300,000 reservists would be mobilized in this regard. However, since it may take several months to create new units equipped with reservist training, commanders, and logistical support, partial mobilization is not expected to have a rapid impact on the battlefield. The number of reservists who receive regular training is only about 4,000 to 5,000.

If internal unrest arises in Russia due to the mobilization order and it becomes difficult to implement, the possibility of nuclear weapon use increases further. President Putin signed a document titled 'National Policy Principles in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence' on June 2, 2020, which must be fulfilled. The core content of this document states, "The national policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature and aims to maintain a sufficient level of nuclear forces for the exercise of nuclear deterrence."

The document also states that if reliable information is obtained about the launch of ballistic missiles aimed at attacking the territory of Russia or its allies, if the enemy uses nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on Russian or allied territory, if the enemy makes it impossible to retaliate with nuclear weapons against very important national and military facilities of Russia, or if an attack using conventional weapons threatens the very existence of the state, then nuclear retaliation is justified. There is sufficient justification for attacking Ukraine.