[Defense Club] When Approaching Public Diplomacy Strategically

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] China and South Korea once maintained good diplomatic relations. The number of exchanges through envoys during the Joseon Dynasty exceeded 1,000 times. At that time, envoys brought tribute to the Chinese emperor. China gave return gifts called sayeo (賜與). Through such envoy diplomacy, Joseon also brought books and grains. At the end of the Goryeo Dynasty, Mun Ik-jeom went to the Yuan Dynasty as an envoy and brought cotton seeds hidden in brush handles, cultivating cotton fields. Park Ji-won introduced various customs of the Qing Dynasty through his work "Yeolha Ilgi."

Pro-Korea-China diplomacy ended there. In the 20th century, China’s diplomacy became arrogant, treating us as if we were a vassal state. After the Moon Jae-in administration took office, the special envoy sent to China was seated at a lower position as if he were a tributary envoy to the emperor, and President Moon was accustomed to ‘eating alone’ during his visit to China. The show of force against Korean companies such as Lotte is still ongoing. During the US-China summit in April 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping told US President Trump, "Korea actually used to be a part of China," which clearly shows how China views us. It is doubtful whether China truly regards South Korea as an ‘independent and sovereign’ country.

Recently, regarding the operational restrictions on THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), the South Korean government claimed to have publicly announced the ‘Three No’s and One Limit’ policy (no additional THAAD deployment, no participation in US missile defense, no participation in the ROK-US-Japan military alliance, and one limit). China opposes THAAD because it believes the THAAD X-band radar (commonly called THAAD radar) can detect China’s strategic movements. The detection range of the THAAD radar installed on the Korean Peninsula reaches 1,000 km, enabling it to monitor Chinese missile units in Northeast China, which would significantly undermine China’s deterrence against the US. The South Korean government has been persuading that "the THAAD battery radar faces a mountain right in front, so it is physically impossible to operate it targeting China." It has also emphasized that "the THAAD battery is structured to defend only the Korean Peninsula, not for US defense."

However, China remains adamant. On the contrary, China has deployed radars with longer detection ranges at the front. A large early warning radar (LPAR) capable of detecting targets as small as 10㎡ within a 5,600 km range has been deployed in the mountainous area of Yiyuan County, Shandong Province. It is estimated by some that it can detect targets within this range. This base is about 800 km in a straight line from Seoul. This is much farther than the detection range of South Korea’s latest Aegis destroyer Jeongjo Daewang’s radar (1,800 km) and the Green Pine radar (500 km). Yet, China has no official stance on this. This is why former USFK Commander Robert Abrams recently said, "The USFK THAAD must clearly explain how it infringes on China’s strategic security interests."

To return to the days of envoy diplomacy where both sides showed courtesy and helped each other, our government must first become confident. To avoid suffering from China’s pressure, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration needs to clearly set priorities in Korea-China relations. A basic strategy is necessary. To prevent giving the impression that pressure works, a firm stance must be maintained on South Korea’s core interests. Otherwise, our diplomacy will remain trapped in a vicious cycle of struggling under China’s pressure.