[War & Business] Neutrality Policies Losing Their Place

On the 18th (local time), Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, unveiled the membership applications of Finland and Sweden at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. With this, Finland abandoned its neutrality policy after 74 years, and Sweden after 208 years. Brussels (Belgium) = EPA·Yonhap News

[Asia Economy Reporter Hyunwoo Lee] As Finland and Sweden abandon their long-standing policies of neutrality and join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), voices calling for the abandonment of neutrality policies are rising even among major neutral countries in Europe. This is due to concerns that the effectiveness of neutrality policies is diminishing amid heightened tensions of a ‘new Cold War’ dividing the world into two sides following the Russia-Ukraine war.

The lesson that indiscriminate neutrality policies during wartime can instead lead to foreign invasion can also be found in our modern history. The Korean Empire, which declared neutrality abroad just before the Russo-Japanese War, ended up losing its sovereignty more easily because of that very declaration of neutrality.

On January 21, 1904, when the war clouds between Russia and Japan were thickening over the Korean Peninsula, the Korean Empire declared wartime neutrality abroad. Although the legations of the great powers received the Korean Empire’s neutrality declaration, no country supported this neutrality.

At the time, John Jordan, the British Minister to Korea, stated at a press conference, "Even if Korea declares neutrality, whether it is Russian or Japanese troops, the side that first occupies the capital in the event of war will inevitably be supported, so it will be difficult to implement neutrality." He warned that the neutrality declaration could actually increase security risks since Korea lacked even the minimum military force to defend itself.

Just before the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean Empire pursued neutral diplomacy with Russia and Japan, but the court was divided into pro-Russian and pro-Japanese factions. The pro-Russian faction claimed to Russia that Korea would side with Russia if war broke out with Japan, while the pro-Japanese faction promised to side with Japan. However, after the war began and Korea declared neutrality, both Russia and Japan opposed it.

Hampered by the neutrality declaration, the Korean Empire was unable to mobilize even minimal defensive forces. When Japanese troops advanced on Hanyang (modern-day Seoul) after the war broke out on February 8, there were reportedly about 5,000 defenders in Hanyang and 30,000 nationwide. However, due to the neutrality declaration, these forces were not mobilized, and the Japanese army entered Hanyang without resistance the next day.

Subsequently, under Japanese coercion, the Korea-Japan Protocol was promulgated, officially aligning the Korean Empire with Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. According to the protocol, the Korean Empire handed over all military operational areas to the Japanese army and promised active material support. Ultimately, the Korean Empire broke its own neutrality declaration, and the entire country became a battlefield for Russia and Japan. John Jordan’s prediction was thus proven accurate.

Amid the Russia-Ukraine war, as the world once again divides into two camps, the space for neutrality policies is rapidly shrinking. In this rapidly changing security environment, our government, which must navigate diplomacy between the U.S. and China, may need to carefully reconsider the failure of neutral diplomacy during the late Joseon period.