Why Did the United States Hold Back Korea So Much? [Reading Science]

Blocked Independent Launch Vehicle Technology Development by 1979 US-ROK Missile Guidelines
Solid Launch Vehicle Performance Restrictions Lifted Only in 2020 4th Revision
May US-ROK Leaders Agree to Abolish, but Causes Complications and Budget Waste

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Reporter Kim Bong-su] Following President Moon Jae-in's visit to the United States last May, the South Korea-U.S. missile guidelines were completely abolished. Why were such strange restrictions imposed on a sovereign nation? And what impact did this have on us?

According to a paper published recently in the Korea Aerospace Research Institute's 'Aerospace Industry Technology Trends,' the missile guidelines were a 'humiliation' from the start, violating the principle of fairness not only with other U.S. allies but also with North Korea, which developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Furthermore, they caused enormous obstacles and budget waste in South Korea's independent military and space development.

◇ Voluntary Surrender by the Military Regime

The missile guidelines originated in 1979 during the late Park Chung-hee regime when the Agency for Defense Development developed South Korea's first ballistic missile, 'Baekgom.' When the U.S., concerned about military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, sent a letter demanding a halt to missile development, then Defense Minister No Jae-hyun 'voluntarily' promised not to develop missiles with a range exceeding 180 km or a warhead weight over 500 kg, thus establishing the missile guidelines. Even so, South Korea's missile development faced twists and turns, such as the disbandment of the missile development team at the Agency for Defense Development after President Park Chung-hee's death.

South Korea's missile development restrictions were much stricter compared to other U.S. 'allies.' In 1987, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, centered around the U.S., signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which prohibited 'interstate transfers' of rocket systems and unmanned aerial vehicles with a payload over 500 kg and a range over 300 km. However, independent development was fully permitted. This shows how humiliating and discriminatory South Korea's missile guidelines were, completely restricting autonomous missile development. Nevertheless, South Korea, while watching the U.S. closely, continuously pursued missile performance improvements and developed the Hyunmoo (Baekgom-2) missile in 1990.

◇ Restrictions Extended to Space Development

The missile guidelines were first revised in 2001, 22 years later. The range and payload limits were relaxed to the MTCR standards (300 km, 500 kg). The problem was that provisions regarding space launch vehicles were included for the first time, restricting South Korea's autonomous space development. At that time, South Korea and the U.S. agreed that space launch vehicles (including scientific rockets) would be permitted regardless of range or payload, and military satellite launches such as communication and reconnaissance satellites were allowed. However, civilian space launch vehicles were limited to liquid propulsion engines only, and solid propellant performance was restricted to auxiliary propulsion units and satellite apogee motors with a total impulse under 1 million pound-seconds. There were also restrictions that they could not be converted for military use and that military rocket stages could not be used. Why did the U.S. interfere with South Korea's rightful autonomy in this way? Even in the second revision in 2012, military missile range was extended from 300 km to 800 km (payload remained 500 kg), but there was no change regarding space launch vehicles.

◇ North Korea Develops ICBM-Class Missiles

Meanwhile, North Korea, trying to compensate for falling behind in conventional military power, continued nuclear tests and in 2017 launched the Hwasong-14, an ICBM-class ballistic missile, accelerating its military capabilities. South Korea was stuck under the missile guidelines during this period. Notably, the shackles on South Korea's space development remained unchanged in the third revision (2017), and only in the fourth revision in 2020 was the solid propellant performance restriction lifted. Still, bans on military conversion of liquid propulsion engines, use of military rocket stages, and mobile launchers remained. Why were such shackles imposed on South Korea while North Korea was freely launching ICBMs with ranges exceeding 10,000 km? Was it because South Korea was called an 'ally' in name only and not trusted? Or was it due to concerns about China's backlash? It seems these concerns were meaningless.

[Image source=Yonhap News]

◇ Twists, Turns, and Budget Waste

Due to these U.S. shackles, South Korea experienced difficulties not only militarily but also in space development, mainly because of the solid propellant performance limits. For example, after the first revision allowed space launch vehicle development, South Korea developed the Naroho (KSLV-1) space launch vehicle starting in 2002 and successfully launched it in January 2013. The second stage solid propellant used was restricted by the missile guidelines' limit of 'total impulse of 1 million pound-seconds.' Particularly, in the Korean Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO) development project, planned in the early 2010s and intensified from 2016, twists and budget waste occurred. The Korea Aerospace Research Institute had to minimize KPLO's design weight to 550 kg, and one major reason was the performance restrictions imposed by the missile guidelines. However, the final KPLO weight exceeded the limit by 128 kg at 678 kg, and contrary to the original plan, South Korea had to pay hundreds of millions of won more to the U.S. company SpaceX.

Ultimately, South Korea had no choice but to practically exclude solid propellants in the space launch vehicle sector, and the Nuri rocket, scheduled to launch on the 21st of next month, was developed with liquid propulsion engines for all three stages.

Regarding this, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute stated in a report, "We have continuously requested the U.S. side to strengthen solid propulsion capabilities of space launch vehicles corresponding to the expansion of military missile capabilities, but it was not realized," and added, "Because the main focus of the missile guideline revisions was military purposes, the civilian space launch vehicle sector was relatively deprioritized."