[Yang Nak-gyu's Defence Club] Will the joint exercise be announced as a surprise again?

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] There is speculation that the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises scheduled for the second half of this year might be announced suddenly just one day before the training. Although the joint exercises are only 10 days away, the Ministry of National Defense keeps repeating that the timing and method of the exercises have not yet been decided.

On the 29th, Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Boo Seung-chan responded to questions about whether the restoration of inter-Korean communication lines would lead to the suspension or reduction of the South Korea-U.S. exercises by saying, "As I have repeatedly stated, the timing, scale, and method of the second half joint command post exercises have not yet been finalized."

The Ministry of National Defense also announced the South Korea-U.S. joint exercises only one day in advance on March 7. This was the day before the joint exercises held from March 8 to 18, which proceeded without outdoor field maneuvers. The Ministry was passive in announcing the joint exercises in March 2018, notifying North Korea of the scale and defensive nature of the annual exercises and stating that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission would verify compliance with the armistice agreement.

At that time, there were criticisms both inside and outside the military suggesting that there might be disagreements between South Korea and the U.S. regarding the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) or that they were trying to avoid provoking North Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un publicly demanded the suspension of South Korea-U.S. joint exercises at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea held in January.

The Ministry of National Defense also changed the name of the South Korea-U.S. joint exercises starting in 2019. Right after the Singapore Summit in March 2019, the exercises were called ‘Dongmaeng 19-1’ (Alliance 19-1), and later the name ‘Dongmaeng’ (Alliance) disappeared, with the exercises being referred to as ‘joint command post exercises’ for the first and second halves of the year.

Some view this as ongoing disagreements between South Korea and the U.S. over the OPCON transfer. President Moon is evaluated as being focused on minimizing the scale of the exercises and reducing their size just to maintain appearances. Through this, the goal is to meet the OPCON transfer target while also reducing provocations toward the North.

However, the U.S. stance appears different. In January, the U.S. Department of Defense effectively put the brakes on South Korea’s push to expedite the OPCON transfer. The Biden administration, like the Trump administration before it, has confirmed a cautious approach to the OPCON transfer, effectively slowing down the Moon administration’s efforts to accelerate related discussions.

In 2014, South Korea and the U.S. agreed on the principle of OPCON transfer based on three conditions: ▲ securing the Republic of Korea Armed Forces’ capability to lead combined operations, ▲ securing the capability to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and ▲ changes in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and the region. Through these evaluation criteria, the process of verification through three stages?Initial Operational Capability (IOC), Full Operational Capability (FOC), and Full Mission Capability (FMC)?was also agreed upon. These stages are verified through the South Korea-U.S. joint exercises, and the results are reported to the presidents of both countries to make the final decision on the timing of the OPCON transfer.