[Professor Hwang Jae-ho's Diplomatic Odyssey] Former Ambassador Wi Seong-rak: "For the New Northern Policy, Accumulating Success Experiences Matters More Than a 'Grand Vision'"

Ambassador Wi Seong-rak, former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Russia, is being interviewed at a cafe in Seongdong-gu, Seoul on the 13th. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung aymsdream@

[Asia Economy Reporter Lee Ji-eun]

7. 'A Realist Who Does Not Abandon Idealism' - Former Ambassador to Russia, Wi Sung-rak

Interviewer/Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at the School of International Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, serves as a member of the Presidential Policy Planning Committee and Director of the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE).

There are broadly two domestic groups influencing Korean diplomacy. One consists of those who have worked in academia and as experts before being appointed to government positions. The other comprises those who have long served as government officials before moving into academia or expert roles. In any case, the goal is to combine expertise with policy to create synergy. Among the latter group, the most well-known figure currently, who offers meaningful suggestions on national strategy with a long-term perspective rather than simple situational analysis, is former Ambassador to Russia Wi Sung-rak. Ambassador Wi is a strategist on the U.S. and Russia, having twice served as the chief representative of the Six-Party Talks and head of the Korean Peninsula Peace Negotiation Headquarters, contributing to the 2012 North Korea-U.S. '2.29 Agreement.' We met him on the 13th at a coffee shop in downtown Seoul.

- Ambassador, in your book on upgrading Korean diplomacy published late last year, you pointed out five major problems: self-centered and emotional perspectives, domestic politics-centered views, ideological partisanship, populism, and amateurism. What is the most urgent task in reforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

▲ First, we must start by acknowledging that we have these problems. The notion that 'Korean diplomacy is doing well enough' is an inaccurate assessment and must be discarded.

If it is difficult to spread awareness and discussion of the problems in Korean diplomacy throughout society, then at least within the diplomatic and security community, a sense of problem awareness must arise, and leadership to address these issues must be demonstrated. In other words, new thought leaders must emerge among bureaucrats, politicians, civil society, media, and academia dealing with diplomatic and security issues. Narrowing the scope further, there needs to be a collective recognition emphasizing true professionalism within the diplomatic and security community. This is professionalism.

Korean diplomacy has historically been mired in administration, protocol, and ceremonial events. For Korean diplomacy to develop, an atmosphere within the government that values policy, strategy, and tactics must be established. Since democratization, as regimes have changed continuously, political elites with power have increasingly intervened in diplomacy, deepening its politicization, which naturally diminished the emphasis on professionalism within the diplomatic and security community, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Compared to international standards, Korean diplomacy's professionalism is already not high, and if these problems persist, the five issues mentioned and cynicism will become more widespread throughout diplomacy. This is a very tragic story. To solve these problems, individuals with new awareness within the diplomatic and security community must play roles, and through their solidarity, reform discourse must continue.

- I think Korean diplomacy should move in this direction. It should review Korea's mid- to long-term national security strategy directions and tasks to gauge strategic orientation and diversify policy options. To become a multipolar player protecting our national interests, innovation in strategy, institutions, and communication must be premised and executed. Institutional innovation efforts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs level are necessary for efficient and systematic implementation of foreign policy.

Ambassador Wi Seong-rak, former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Russia, is being interviewed at a cafe in Seongdong-gu, Seoul on the 13th. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung aymsdream@

▲ Not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but Korean diplomacy itself requires reform. Many would agree that Korea's diplomatic level is relatively insufficient compared to its national power. When asked about Korea's diplomatic ranking in the international community, I often half-jokingly answer that Korea's diplomatic ranking is likely below Korea's FIFA football ranking. This means Korea's diplomatic level is very low relative to its national power.

If Korean diplomacy remains at its current level, it will face limitations in protecting national interests amid the shifting power dynamics in the 21st century. Moreover, even if an opportunity for unification arises, it will be difficult to seize it. In Germany's case, political, administrative, and legal capacities for unification were accumulated internally well before unification discussions began. Our reality is different. Therefore, even if an opportunity for unification comes, it is questionable whether we can effectively utilize it. Setting aside unification, efforts toward North Korea's denuclearization and peacebuilding are also insufficient. All these relate to our lack of diplomatic capacity.

Ambassador Wi Seong-rak, former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Russia, is being interviewed at a cafe in Seongdong-gu, Seoul on the 13th. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung aymsdream@

- Despite this, what strengths does Korean diplomacy have?

▲ I am not a scholar but someone who has handled practical diplomacy. From a practical, realistic diplomatic perspective, Korean diplomacy has few policy strengths. If I were to find strengths in Korean diplomacy, again using football as a metaphor, although tactics, strategy, and skills are at a low level, the great strength is that it diligently runs toward the goal. In other words, Korean diplomacy moves passionately once a goal is set and has the will to achieve short-term objectives. However, it lacks the capacity to pursue coherent policy goals through this.

- If Korean diplomacy could be upgraded to the highest level as your book title suggests, what would it look like? What role could it play globally?

▲ If Korean diplomacy is upgraded, Korea could play a mediating role in expanding areas of peace, cooperation, and shared prosperity among the four powers?the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia?without being swayed between the U.S. and China. Given our national power, it is impossible to dominate other countries, but as a middle power, Korea could serve as a hub for cooperation in Northeast Asia and the broader Asian region. This would increase Korea's future geopolitical and international political role, allowing us to act as a facilitator or mediator. If this is possible, the path toward unification would also be smoother.

- Like German unification, if the time for unification on the Korean Peninsula comes, garnering support from neighboring countries will be vital. Can we properly persuade them?

▲ The most important factor in Korean Peninsula unification will be the thoughts and role of the United States. China, due to geopolitical interests, is unlikely to be proactive about unification and will probably seek to maintain the status quo. Russia also maintains a stance favoring the status quo, though less so than China. Ultimately, the U.S.'s active role is most important, followed by how we respond to China's passive stance. I am skeptical whether we have the diplomatic capacity to persuade the U.S. to take an active role and China to open the path to unification when the opportunity arises.

- As the head of the Korean Peninsula Peace Negotiation Headquarters and chief representative of the Six-Party Talks, you must have many reflections. How do you view the diplomacy of the six countries?

▲ The diplomatic styles and negotiation cultures of the six countries differ significantly. In regional studies, the customs, temperament, history, traditions, and cultures of each country or region greatly influence their diplomatic styles.

Looking at the diplomatic tactics and negotiation attitudes regarding the Korean Peninsula issue, the U.S. and North Korea stand at opposite extremes. Japan is closest to the U.S., China is closest to North Korea, Russia is closer to North Korea than China but less so, and South Korea's position varies somewhat depending on progressive or conservative governments, generally occupying a middle ground or a position as close to the U.S. as Japan.

- You served as ambassador to Russia for a long time. What are the characteristics of Russian diplomacy?

▲ Generally, Russia is more direct than the U.S. The U.S. is relatively softer than Russia, but when situations become acute, both Russia and the U.S. exhibit characteristics of great power diplomacy. Ultimately, they tend to push their own claims strongly. Russia, in particular, can sometimes act roughly and aggressively.

Another characteristic is that great powers tend to listen more to voices within their own country than to those of others. The U.S., being a more pluralistic society than Russia or China, has diverse internal voices. Therefore, to persuade the U.S., it is necessary to utilize internal voices such as Congress, media, civil society, and other opinion leaders to create an environment where our views are reflected.

Russia, with less pluralism than the U.S., is different, but as a great power, it also tends to listen to internal voices. Thus, creating allies within Russia can often be useful in a similar way.

- Russia is always evaluated as one of the four powers around the Korean Peninsula along with the U.S., Japan, and China, but its utilization seems low.

▲ Russia's policy on the Korean Peninsula is similar to China's but with nuanced differences. Russia has relatively fewer geopolitical interests in the Korean Peninsula than China but greater concerns about North Korea's denuclearization. Russia, as a country that led the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with the U.S. and Western powers during the Cold War, has thoroughly managed denuclearization issues of countries under its influence. Although North Korea developed nuclear weapons during the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia's stance on denuclearization remains similar to the past. If we utilize these nuances in Russian diplomacy regarding denuclearization, it would be useful.

- The current administration's New Northern Policy targets Russia and Central Asia. How do you evaluate the past four years? Is there any connection with the Northern Policy of the Roh Tae-woo administration with the same name?

▲ The past Northern Policy led to diplomatic normalization with China and Russia, allowing Korea to participate in East-West reconciliation, but it did not lead to reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. The Northern Policy resulted in North Korea's isolation, prompting it to take the nuclear card. Furthermore, Korean diplomacy did not evolve into a post-Cold War style encompassing China and Russia. Korea-Russia relations did not reach a high level of cooperation. These were limitations of the Northern Policy and tasks we must reflect on.

The current administration's New Northern Policy does not seem to be based on reflection on the problems of the past Northern Policy. It still shows poverty in diplomatic philosophy. What I mean is that since the early 1990s Northern Policy, every new administration has emphasized relations with Russia, proposing grand visions like the Eurasia Initiative, gas and railway connections. However, these grand visions lack economic feasibility, and Russia knows well they are unlikely to be realized.

To effectively promote the New Northern Policy, we must identify and develop the shortcomings of the past Northern Policy, but the current administration repeats grand visions with low feasibility. To develop relations with Russia and succeed in the New Northern Policy, we must achieve success in feasible, substantive small projects and accumulate success cases.

Ambassador Wi Seong-rak, former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Russia, is being interviewed at a cafe in Seongdong-gu, Seoul on the 13th. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung aymsdream@

- Korea has been invited to the G7 summit hosted by the UK this June. Is there a possibility of becoming a formal member in the future?

▲ Actually, Korea's participation in the UK-hosted G7 meeting is a precedent in international practice. Specific countries are often invited to G7 meetings on a one-time basis. Therefore, there is no need to place great significance on mere participation. However, since the U.S. currently intends to expand the G7 into a so-called 'G10,' there is an open possibility that Korea, along with India and Australia, could become part of the G10.

- The U.S. clearly has intentions in expanding the G7 to G10. To join G10, Korea would likely need to meet various expectations, similar to joining the Quad.

▲ The U.S. aims to increase the number of countries within its sphere of influence through the G10 to check China and Russia. From Korea's perspective, there is no reason to oppose expanding the G7 to include the G10. As with all international issues, diplomatic choices inevitably involve opportunity costs, and the risks arising must be considered. If the G7 expands to G10 and we join, we will be closer to the U.S. sphere of influence and must respond to the resulting issues.

- The Quad participation controversy has been heated since before President Moon Jae-in's visit to the U.S. Participating now could cause various diplomatic difficulties. Would it be better to observe the situation a bit longer?

▲ It is true that we missed the optimal timing to join the Quad. THAAD was initially a loose alliance with cooperation in non-sensitive functional areas. It would have been best if we had participated at the early stage. Currently, China has already defined the Quad as an anti-China coalition, and we have taken a negative stance, with even the foreign minister saying joining the Quad is not a good idea. Our current participation in the Quad carries risks.

Given the overall and overwhelming competition and confrontation between the U.S. and China, we have continuously avoided choosing coordinates and directions between them, leading to this result. Difficult as it is, a decision is necessary. By decision, I do not mean siding with either the U.S. or China but choosing Korea's position and direction. We must abandon the indecisive attitude of supporting China when it complains and siding with the U.S. when it complains. If this situation repeats, we will be endlessly swayed by the U.S. and China. The THAAD issue became so difficult because of this attitude.

- The Quad controversy in Korean diplomacy seems to stem from Korea's failure to respond appropriately and diplomatically at the right time with suitable diplomatic language. It is regrettable that more diplomatic leeway was not left. Should we eventually join the Quad?

▲ I think the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not done well on the Quad issue, but the main fault lies in the government's indecisiveness. Even now, we can find areas to cooperate with the Quad on a case-by-case basis or consider participating as a quasi-member at the second tier without direct membership.

Ambassador Wi Seong-rak, former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Russia, is being interviewed at a cafe in Seongdong-gu, Seoul on the 13th. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung aymsdream@

- China's concern about the Quad is that cooperation in soft security issues will gradually extend to hard security issues, and the loose consultative body will become more formalized and institutionalized, pressuring China.

▲ When the THAAD issue arose, I said Korea exacerbated the problem. The need for defense against North Korean missiles was first raised during the Kim Dae-jung administration. From then, we should have clearly framed the issue between the U.S. and China. For example, we should have judged that high-altitude defense was necessary to protect Korea's security from North Korea's nuclear missiles and persuaded China that THAAD deployment was to defend Korea from North Korean threats. However, we avoided THAAD deployment. The U.S. military eventually stepped in to deploy even one battery. As a result, without properly explaining our security threat response to China, THAAD appeared to be deployed due to U.S. needs. Korea appeared as a country that allowed this.

The most important thing regarding the Quad is to determine where our national interest lies, set our diplomatic goals accordingly, and maintain consistent and clear policy directions.

- Yes, Korea itself needs to establish a precise and consistent foreign policy direction and stance.

▲ I want to compare Korea's current diplomatic position and future direction to a clock. The U.S. tries to pull us toward 3 o'clock, China toward 9 o'clock, while we have been wavering inconsistently around 10, 2, or 12 o'clock.

Going forward, we need to set a clear and consistent policy direction. Japan has chosen around 2 o'clock, Australia around 2:30, and India around 12:30, maintaining consistency. As a U.S. ally, depending on progressive or conservative governments, I think it is best for Korea to choose a policy direction around 1 o'clock (progressive) or 1:30 (conservative). For example, regarding the Quad, if we chose the 1 o'clock direction, we could not say we will not join the Quad because that would be a 10 o'clock choice. If we stood at 1 o'clock, we would seek ways to cooperate with the Quad.

Ambassador Wi Seong-rak, former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Russia, is being interviewed at a cafe in Seongdong-gu, Seoul on the 13th. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung aymsdream@

- After the COVID-19 crisis, the international community and diplomacy overall seem to be entering a new era. What are the new blue oceans and roles for Korean diplomacy?

▲ There is definitely space for Korean diplomacy to delve into. Historically, we are surrounded by great powers and face very difficult issues such as division and nuclear problems amid great power competition. If we grow into a country that can mediate and foster cooperation rather than friction in relations with great powers, especially amid U.S.-China competition and confrontation, the situation could change.

- Thank you for your valuable time. Lastly, if you could define yourself in one word, what would it be?

▲ I think I am too complex to be defined by a simple word, but if I had to choose, I would say I am a realist who does not abandon idealism. I lean toward realism but am not purely realist. Within me, realism and idealism compete, constantly seeking balance and adjusting coordinates.

Compiled by/Reporter Lee Ji-eun

Transcription/Shin Ui-chan, Researcher at the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation