[Yes and No] Panmunjom Declaration, Already Damaged

[Asia Economy] April 27th last month marked the 3rd anniversary of the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration.

On this day, President Moon Jae-in defined the Panmunjom Declaration as "a milestone of peace that no one can undermine" and emphasized that "under no circumstances can the path of peace promised by the Panmunjom Declaration be reversed."

But did the Panmunjom Declaration truly function as a milestone of peace as the president mentioned? The answer is definitely no. The core of the Panmunjom Declaration is North Korea’s denuclearization for peace.

However, North Korea has shown not even a speck of sincerity since the declaration. Rather, Kim Jong-un, the North Korean Supreme Leader, exploited the Panmunjom Declaration as an extension of the 2013 policy of parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy.

For North Korea, the Panmunjom Declaration was merely a means to "ease (lift) sanctions while maintaining nuclear weapons." At the 8th Party Congress on January 8, Kim revealed that “since November 2017, we have continued the struggle to advance nuclear capabilities.”

South and North Korea approached the Panmunjom Declaration from very different perspectives. South Korea regarded North Korea’s denuclearization as a given for establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, North Korea maintained the stance of ‘sanctions relief → completion of nuclear weapons → absorption unification led by nuclear power.’

Of course, the Panmunjom Declaration, which started by ignoring the harsh reality of the North Korean nuclear threat due to impatience for dialogue, was a mistaken encounter and an agreement that could not be sustained without North Korea’s progressive change.

North Korea’s malicious intent was confirmed at the February 2019 North Korea-U.S. Hanoi Summit. The reason the Hanoi Summit ended in ‘no deal’ was because North Korea’s obsession with nuclear weapons and refusal to denuclearize were confirmed.

Therefore, it was also confirmed that the only option was to make North Korea give up its nuclear weapons on its own, not through dialogue and negotiation. This means directly pressuring North Korea through economic sanctions by the UN Security Council.

The usefulness of sanctions against North Korea lies in their function as a peaceful means to achieve denuclearization. However, the constant obstacle is that seamless international cooperation must continue to achieve the desired results.

After the Hanoi no-deal, North Korea’s attitude drastically changed. This included abusive and rude behavior toward President Moon, missile launches capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons, the blowing up of the inter-Korean liaison office, forced bans on leaflet distribution to the North, and the shooting of a missing South Korean official.

These are means to pressure South Korea and find loopholes in sanctions. The current government shows no sign of escaping the delusion that North Korea will respond in good faith to South Korea’s goodwill.

Remarks in August 2019 about overcoming Japan through a ‘South-North peace economy’ amid Japan’s designation of South Korea as a white-list country, plans to use the upcoming July Tokyo Olympics as an opportunity for inter-Korean dialogue, and the May 21 South Korea-U.S. summit are all focused solely on a one-sided approach toward North Korea.

Recalling memories of the Panmunjom pedestrian bridge and saying “the time to start dialogue again is approaching” is a glimpse of the blindfolded North Korea policy.

The consistent will to continue the momentum of the Panmunjom Declaration, dreaming of a ‘great transformation in world history’ mentioned at the May 2018 South Korea-U.S. summit, is commendable.

However, our goodwill did not bring about goodwill results, and impatience led to losing the initiative in dialogue and negotiations. Therefore, we cannot rely on the damaged Panmunjom Declaration.

Rather, a new strategy for North Korea’s denuclearization is urgently needed.

The May South Korea-U.S. summit is an opportunity. It should be used to devise strategies of sanctions and pressure based on the South Korea-U.S. alliance and to seek fundamental measures to block China’s support for North Korea. Only then can we find clues to North Korea’s denuclearization. We hope for a progressive change in the government’s direction.

Jo Young-ki, Special Professor at Kookmin University