[Professor Hwang Jae-ho's Diplomatic Odyssey] Former Minister Han Seung-joo: "Current Government Shows Submissive Attitude Toward China... Diplomacy Should Not Be 'Pushed Around'"

Emotional Anti-Japan Stance of Moon Administration and Low Profile Toward China Regrettable
Northward Diplomacy of Roh Tae-woo Government and Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung Government as 'Effective Code Diplomacy'

[Asia Economy Reporter Lee Ji-eun]

4. Han Seung-joo, First Ambassador to the U.S. under the Roh Moo-hyun Administration, Chairman of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Interview / Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Hwang Jae-ho, professor at the International Studies Department of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, serves as a member of the Presidential Policy Planning Committee and director of the Global Strategy Cooperation Institute. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE).

Han Seung-joo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the U.S., and professor of political science and diplomacy at Korea University, is a senior figure in South Korea’s diplomatic community. His voice was calm yet precise without any gaps. He has consistently expressed clear opinions on important Korean diplomatic issues, but his newly published book at the end of January, "Is There Diplomacy in Korea?" sparked a more intense response than ever before.

In the book, he strongly criticized current Korean diplomacy as "3 Nos (No talent, No procedure, No policy) and 1 Yes (Only code) diplomacy," which provided a significant platform for discourse in academia, diplomacy, and society. On March 25, we met him at the Chairman’s office of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies for an interview.

Han Seung-joo, Chairman of Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Photo by Kim Hyun-min kimhyun81@

- Chairman, you mentioned that the president’s appointment of senior diplomatic officials and ambassadors based on code rather than expertise causes major problems in diplomacy. However, some argue that since diplomacy is influenced by the highest leader’s personality and governing philosophy, code appointments are inevitable, and the real problem lies in the lack of expertise rather than code appointments. What is your view?

▲ It is natural and within the president’s rights to strive to implement the direction or policy content they have envisioned after being elected. However, to realize the direction or policy content one envisions, it is necessary to carefully consider the situations before and after taking office because information and perceptions about international and domestic circumstances can change. Therefore, it is irresponsible to think that the promises made before election must be implemented unconditionally without sober judgment of the situation. While it is desirable to fulfill promises made reflecting public opinion before election, this does not necessarily mean it benefits the country.

- You mentioned 3 Nos and 1 Yes diplomacy. Is there diplomacy that corresponds to the opposite, 3 Yes and 1 No? Or is it "Is there no diplomacy in Korea?"

▲ The concept of 3 Nos and 1 Yes diplomacy was not originally my idea but emerged during an interview with another media outlet. The concept of 3 Nos and 1 Yes diplomacy originated from U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken’s criticism of Trump’s diplomacy in 2018. It referred to the absence of talent (No people), procedure (No procedure), and policy (No policy). Trump was a businessman, not a politician. Therefore, after his election, Trump lacked a specific political ideology, policy perspective, or direction, and his officials and staff tended to make decisions based on intuition and impulse. Trump’s diplomacy lacked awareness of considering the context before and after policy decisions, confidence in choices, consideration of consequences, and exit strategies in case of failure.

I felt this concept also resonates with the reality of Korean diplomacy. However, Korean diplomacy is not devoid of purpose or ideological basis like Trump’s. Korean diplomacy has shown clear policy directions, especially regarding relations with North Korea. Although the directions differ, Korean diplomacy has deeply discussed how to change North Korea and improve relations with it.

- Actually, while the 3 Nos are significant, the controversy over the 1 Yes, the code, seems even greater.

▲ The term "code" is quite difficult to translate directly into English. Translations like ideology, tendency, or perspective do not fully capture its meaning. It is more appropriate to see it as a concept encompassing all these. Ultimately, "code" has become a term widely used in domestic and international politics, not so much a historically rooted concept but a newly emerged one. Many people tend to view "code" negatively, but it is not necessarily negative. For example, prioritizing peace or strengthening cooperative relations rather than zero-sum games with other countries are policy directions that can be pursued through suitable personnel, which is a positive aspect of code. In some respects, code can be seen as a policy line. Pursuing policy consistency with a single line can be effective and yield positive results.

Han Seung-joo, Chairman of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies (left), and Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- Which government effectively pursued code diplomacy in Korean diplomacy?

▲ The Northern Diplomacy of the Roh Tae-woo administration and the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung administration can be seen as dynamic and forceful policies based on a single line. Among these, I think the Sunshine Policy showed more characteristics of code or line. President Kim Dae-jung reflected not only diplomatic qualities but also personal traits and regional ties in appointments. At that time, regional ties had significant influence. Considering that certain regions were politically marginalized since past authoritarian regimes, appointments through regional ties during Kim Dae-jung’s presidency can be understood as historical compensation. The Kim Dae-jung administration adopted a pragmatic policy line.

Pragmatic diplomacy means that the content of diplomacy realizes the nation’s beneficial goals by excluding ideology, emotions, personal ties, or policymakers’ personal interests or codes. Considering these aspects comprehensively, I raised the question, "Is there diplomacy in Korea?" and published the book earlier this year. However, my question about whether there is diplomacy in Korea is not solely a critique of the current government. Due to the book’s title, many people misunderstood it as a black-and-white critique of the current government’s diplomacy. What I wanted to emphasize was the macro issue regarding the direction and trend of Korean diplomacy. I believe Korea is moving toward a direction of "no diplomacy." My book discusses the flow encompassing past and current governments rather than focusing on a specific administration. I hoped it would be used academically rather than as a critique.

- What is the biggest regret regarding the current government’s diplomacy?

▲ Policies biased toward anti-Japan sentiment, abandoning the Korea-Japan comfort women agreement without alternatives or exit strategies; unconditional submissiveness to China accepting the "3 No" stance; reducing joint military exercises with the U.S. and signing military agreements with North Korea in the name of peace, weakening security; underestimating North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and exaggerating denuclearization willingness during the Trump administration to facilitate U.S.-North Korea summits.

Professor Hwang Jae-ho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. / Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- Despite that, if you can find any, what are the strengths of the current government’s diplomacy?

▲ Paradoxically, not terminating the Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA); not liquidating and seizing cash from assets of Nippon Steel (formerly Shinnippon Steel) and Mitsubishi related to forced labor during World War II; successfully leading defense cost-sharing negotiations with the U.S., helping resolve issues.

- Much controversy in Korean diplomacy stems from our stance toward the U.S. and China. First, regarding the broader U.S.-China relationship, there was a recent high-level diplomatic meeting in Alaska. How do you view the intense debate between the two countries?

▲ When I was ambassador to the U.S., I met both Blinken and Yang Jiechi frequently. Yang Jiechi, who served as interpreter when U.S. presidents visited China, knows the U.S. well and avoided offending Americans. However, after becoming China’s ambassador to the U.S. and entering the Xi Jinping era, he often made pointed criticisms of the U.S. during diplomatic talks. This shows Yang Jiechi acts as Xi Jinping’s diplomatic close aide and effectively serves as the prime minister of China’s diplomacy.

From my experience, Blinken is a relatively quiet, scholarly, and rational figure. Therefore, his strong response to Yang Jiechi’s hardline remarks at the Alaska talks was unexpected. Personally, I think it is unhelpful for the U.S. to adopt a hardline stance toward China similar to China’s approach. President Theodore Roosevelt advised to carry a big stick but speak softly, meaning softer words are better. Considering China’s diplomatic system, Yang Jiechi’s hardline stance was predictable. However, it is necessary to understand the political intent behind the U.S. maintaining a hardline stance through Blinken at this meeting. I interpret this as Biden’s attempt to remind the domestic audience of a strong America. Biden is likely to continue emphasizing a strong America and may show even tougher stances.

Han Seung-joo, Chairman of Asan Institute for Policy Studies. / Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- In a recent interview, you mentioned that President Biden, having served 40 years in the Senate including as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and having dealt with North Korea issues, along with his experienced diplomatic aides, means President Moon Jae-in should not have an obsessive or excessive effort to achieve results during his term. What should our diplomacy toward the U.S. do or avoid in the remaining year?

▲ Recently, the U.S. has adopted a "tit-for-tat" strategy toward North Korea. Although unpredictable, the U.S. is unlikely to maintain a consistently hardline stance and symmetric strategy toward North Korea. Currently, North Korea faces critical challenges due to COVID-19 affecting medical facilities, personnel, and funds, along with ongoing sanctions. In this context, Biden is expected to adopt a strategy balancing Obama’s "strategic patience" and Trump’s "maximum pressure." Therefore, urging the U.S. to resume summit-level talks with North Korea is not only ineffective but may backfire. Although the term is short, rather than obsessively pushing the U.S. to reconcile with North Korea, it is more useful to engage in serious strategic dialogue independent of U.S. codes.

- Many experts expect the Biden administration’s diplomacy to proceed in a bottom-up manner. Considering Biden’s age, many view his term as four years without reelection. Is there a possibility that Biden might adopt a top-down approach in North Korea relations to achieve diplomatic achievements?

▲ Even if Biden pursues diplomacy top-down, it is unlikely he will produce a big deal like Trump. However, the nature and content of Biden’s diplomacy may change. The Trump administration approached denuclearization differently from North Korea. The U.S. did not fully understand North Korea’s denuclearization direction, and even if it did, it was far from the U.S.’s desired approach. Currently, Biden’s diplomatic experts likely understand North Korea’s intentions more accurately. Some progress may occur during Biden’s term, but a substantial big deal is unlikely. If Biden cannot be reelected, it will naturally affect U.S. diplomacy and Korea-U.S. relations but not fatally. When President Roosevelt died in 1945, important decisions like NATO’s establishment and the Truman Doctrine were largely driven by the vice president and lower officials. It is hard to predict how current Vice President Kamala Harris will conduct diplomacy, but with professional diplomats in place, preparations should be adequate.

Han Seung-joo, Chairman of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies (left), and Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- You mentioned in an interview that China tends to pressure countries that appear weak, and South Korea often yields easily, but to protect our principles and interests, some sacrifices must be accepted. What are our principles and interests regarding China?

▲ China is our top trading partner globally and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the only country with influence over North Korea, giving it significant leverage over us. Since Xi Jinping’s rise in the 2000s, China has greatly strengthened its military and now uses its vast economic power as a diplomatic weapon. However, we cannot succumb to China’s pressure in every matter or act as China desires. Singapore and Australia, despite China’s pressure, have not conceded their policies, teaching the lesson that "China’s pressure can be resisted." China often talks about "teaching lessons" to neighboring countries, but we must realize that China’s policy is not always effective.

- However, Singapore and Australia are geographically farther from China and not directly involved in issues like North Korea, so their strategies may not be applicable to us.

▲ Looking back, when the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) issue first arose, the Korean government claimed there was no U.S. request or demand, which was untrue. China’s pressure on Korea intensified due to THAAD. Although it is still early to evaluate Korea’s response, I believe Korea could have responded differently to China’s hardline statements and sanctions. In diplomacy with China, it is undesirable to proceed in a top-down manner simply because China threatens Korea. China has always used a "lesson-teaching" diplomatic strategy. But why should only one side learn lessons? Usually, the weaker party, Korea or the counterpart, should learn lessons, not China. We need to reconsider this. While it is difficult to confront China’s lesson diplomacy and pressure like Singapore or Australia, adopting a completely submissive diplomacy is problematic. It is important in diplomacy to show that we have clear positions and convictions, not for pride but to demonstrate dignity. Even when conceding, doing so with dignity is diplomatically important. Although China has many ways to pressure Korea, Korea also has means to pressure China.

- Lastly, if you were to define yourself in one word, what would it be?

▲ Throughout my life, I have held various positions and engaged in diverse activities, but I want to be defined by others as a professor. Being a professor is a very challenging profession. It requires scholarly knowledge, conscience, and conviction. It is difficult but rewarding. Through being a professor, I have been able to freely express my beliefs, which I consider my greatest advantage. Therefore, I think defining myself as a professor is most appropriate.

Compiled by Reporter Lee Ji-eun @leezn

Transcription by Shin Ui-chan, Researcher at the Global Strategy Cooperation Institute