[Professor Hwang Jae-ho's Diplomatic Odyssey] Chairman Moon Jeong-in: "We Must Pursue Transcendent Diplomacy Beyond US-China Camp Diplomacy"

Interview_Moon Jung-in, Chairman of Sejong Institute (Conversation with Professor Hwang Jae-ho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)./Photo by Kim Hyun-min kimhyun81@

[Asia Economy Reporter Yoo In-ho]

3. 'Progressive Realist' Moon Jung-in, Chairman of Sejong Institute

Interview / Professor Hwang Jae-ho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Professor Hwang Jae-ho of the Department of International Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies serves as a member of the Presidential Policy Planning Committee and director of the Global Strategy Cooperation Institute. He earned his Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE).

Professors at Korean universities generally fall into three categories: teaching, research, and policy. Excelling in just one is challenging, but Moon Jung-in, Chairman of the Sejong Institute, fits all three. He is renowned for his outstanding lectures, has authored about 400 domestic and international research papers and books, and has served as a member of the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s Northeast Asia Era Committee and currently as a special advisor on unification, diplomacy, and security to President Moon Jae-in.

He is also the only domestic scholar to have participated in all inter-Korean summits to date. He has always been at the center of discourse on our diplomatic and security policies, reflecting both his controversial nature and policy influence.

Recently, he published a new book titled Moon Jung-in’s Future Scenarios, boldly presenting future scenarios for Korean diplomacy as the title suggests.

Moon Jung-in, Chairman of the Sejong Institute (left), and Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, in conversation. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- Recently, a high-level US-China diplomatic meeting was held in Alaska. It attracted global attention as the first meeting between the two great powers’ diplomatic leaders under the Biden administration. How did you view it?

▲ I was initially concerned that the US might hold 2+2 talks only with South Korea and Japan, excluding China, but fortunately, the meeting took place in Alaska, a strategically neutral location, with China participating. On the Chinese side, Yang Jiechi, a member of the Political Bureau responsible for foreign affairs, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended, while the US was represented by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, making it a 2+2 meeting involving the key diplomatic figures of both countries.

As expected, the talks saw direct clashes over values and geopolitical issues. Blinken and Sullivan appeared to make strong statements mindful of domestic US public opinion, while Yang Jiechi also intensified his rhetoric considering China’s domestic response.

However, I heard that in unofficial meetings, there were in-depth discussions on various topics including COVID-19, climate change, economic issues, cybersecurity, China’s Coast Guard Law, Myanmar, and the Korean Peninsula.

Overall, I evaluate the Alaska talks positively in that they opened channels for dialogue and created a forum for discussion. While the confrontational aspects have been emphasized, we must consider both cooperation and competition. Since dialogue channels remain open between the two countries, there is no need to view US-China relations with despair.

- Given that Biden’s diplomatic team chose Asia as their first tour destination, can we say that the main axis of US foreign policy has shifted from Europe and the Middle East to Asia?

Interview_Moon Jung-in, Chairman of Sejong Institute (Conversation with Professor Hwang Jae-ho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)./Photo by Kim Hyun-min kimhyun81@

▲ Fundamentally, President Obama sought rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific region through the ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy. The perception was that the US had been overly focused and entangled in the Middle East, allowing China’s rise in Asia-Pacific. The Trump administration also emphasized the Indo-Pacific strategy. I see the Biden administration’s diplomatic direction as a continuation of these policies. With China’s rise becoming more visible, the US inevitably must focus on the Asia region.

- Within the US, China’s rise is seen as a major threat, distinct from previous challenges posed by countries like Germany or the Soviet Union, as China is the first non-Western challenger. Given recent attacks on Asians in the US, is the ‘Yellow Peril’ theory and the possibility of a clash of civilizations still relevant?

▲ That possibility cannot be ruled out. In the late 19th century, the ‘Yellow Peril’ theory emerged in Europe to check Qing China. It disappeared after the Qing dynasty’s decline but reemerged in the mid-1920s as Japan rose as a regional hegemon. In the 1980s, as Japan challenged the US economy, ‘Japan-bashing’ appeared, and now ‘China-bashing’ has emerged.

Western powers have historically sought to contain Asian challengers. Professor Samuel Huntington viewed the 21st century not as an ideological confrontation but as a clash of civilizations and cultural identities. The COVID-19 pandemic has made such signs more visible in the US and Europe. The surge in anti-Asian hate crimes in the US and Australia is a representative example.

Moreover, regardless of the reality of the China threat, these countries tend to demonize and antagonize China for domestic political reasons. ‘China-bashing’ is politically popular. Political elites, intellectuals, and opinion leaders amplify rather than block this trend. If this intensifies, the possibility of a clash of civilizations will increase.

Professor Jaeho Hwang, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- Domestically, the term ‘new Cold War’ between the US and China is frequently used.

▲ The term ‘new Cold War’ implies a recurrence of ideological confrontation between the US and China in the 21st century, similar to the Cold War of the past. In my recent book Moon Jung-in’s Future Scenarios, I addressed signs of the new Cold War from four perspectives: first, geopolitical confrontation; second, geoeconomic confrontation; third, technological nationalism clashes; and finally, ideological and value conflicts.

Interview_Moon Jung-in, Chairman of Sejong Institute (Conversation with Professor Hwang Jae-ho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)./Photo by Kim Hyun-min kimhyun81@

The most concerning are ideological and value conflicts and geopolitical confrontation. I see the current situation as on the borderline between a cold peace and a new Cold War. If the world falls into a new Cold War, not only the US and China but also South Korea and most countries worldwide will face severe difficulties. Middle powers sharing common interests, including South Korea, must cooperate to prevent the emergence of a new Cold War. This is our collective responsibility at this stage.

- Ultimately, the four years of the Biden administration will be a critical period determining whether we enter a new Cold War. If we want to define the current situation as a new Cold War, we must first clearly define it and establish criteria for judgment. We need to comprehensively consider whether multilateral mechanisms and functions in the international community are lost, whether power blocs centered on the two great powers form and antagonize each other, and whether ideological and civilizational conflicts surface.

▲ Currently, the Biden administration pursues cooperation with China on COVID-19, climate change, North Korea’s nuclear issue, and Iran; fierce competition in trade and technology; and confrontation in values and geopolitics. However, pursuing all these simultaneously will be difficult.

If the US recognizes the ideological identity of the Chinese Communist Party but interferes in China’s internal affairs on the basis of values and geopolitically encircles and contains China, cooperation in other areas will become practically impossible, and competition will become more hostile. This is a shortcut to a new Cold War. Recognizing this, Dr. Henry Kissinger emphasized that “the new Cold War is avoidable and must be avoided,” warning that failure to prevent it could lead to a catastrophe akin to World War I in 1914.

Moon Jung-in, Chairman of the Sejong Institute (left), and Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, in conversation. / Photo by Kim Hyun-min kimhyun81@

- Then, is China a real and existential threat to us?

▲ That is a very difficult question. Many around us mention the China threat theory, but when asked to specify the threat, they cannot provide answers. That is the reality of the China threat theory. Currently, China does not pose a military threat to South Korea nor provide weapons or logistical support to North Korea.

We do not feel a real threat regarding the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea issues, or freedom of navigation. Although economic threats against us remain after the THAAD deployment, I do not think this seriously threatens our security. One concern is the argument that since we are a US ally and China threatens the US, South Korea must side with the US.

There is a problem here as well. Perceptions of the intensity of China’s threat to the US differ, and few citizens would agree with equating this with a direct threat to us and advocating hostility toward China. I believe conservative opinion leaders and the media tend to exaggerate the China threat theory.

- The intense US-China confrontation is breaking down the traditional diplomatic stance of South Korea, known as Anmi-Gyeongjung (安美經中), meaning security with the US and economy with China.

▲ Actually, the term Anmi-Gyeongjung seems inappropriate nowadays. Both the US and China are important countries for security and economy. We must continue the traditional policy of alliance with the US and strategic cooperative partnership with China. China does not oppose South Korea maintaining an alliance with the US.

However, the ROK-US alliance should not antagonize China. The US has not yet demanded that South Korea break its strategic cooperative partnership with China. Recently, during a visit to Europe, Secretary of State Blinken stated that Europe would not force a choice between the US and China and understands the complexity of such decisions.

I believe this applies to South Korea as well. In the short term, we should choose a status quo strategy of maintaining the alliance with the US and strategic cooperative partnership with China. When this becomes difficult, we must pursue a transcendent diplomacy beyond the US-China camp division.

Professor Hwang Jae-ho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. / Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- On the Korean Peninsula, China’s rise contrasts sharply with the relative decline of the US. As you wrote in your book, during the Byeongjahoran (the Qing invasion of Joseon in 1636), there was fierce internal diplomatic debate between the Cheokhwa faction (anti-Qing) and the Juhwa faction (pro-Qing), reflecting the rising Later Jin and declining Ming. This overlaps with our current diplomacy amid US-China confrontation.

▲ Fundamentally, people have different perceptions of issues, so opinions differ on which line to follow between the US and China. The US-China line issue can be summarized into three groups. The first group emphasizes values and identity, views China as a major threat, and argues for moving forward with the US.

Simply put, this group prioritizes the ROK-US alliance. The second group looks back on 5,000 years of Chinese history and questions whether China currently poses a real threat. This group prefers to withhold judgment and observe possibilities rather than prematurely turning China into an enemy over issues like the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

Interview_Moon Jung-in, Chairman of Sejong Institute (Conversation with Professor Hwang Jae-ho of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)./Photo by Kim Hyun-min kimhyun81@

The last, third group, citing our history of the Byeongjahoran and the humiliation of Samjeondo, argues that we should change our line to side with the rising China. I belong to the second group.

- Imagining, during the Byeongjahoran, would you have been with the Juhwa faction or the Cheokhwa faction?

▲ Given the circumstances, I would probably be like Choi Myung-gil of the Juhwa faction. In fact, three years ago, a newspaper column compared me to Choi Myung-gil.

- You mentioned that for our diplomacy to function properly, it must have diplomatic capabilities such as smart diplomacy, principled and resolute diplomacy, diplomacy based on national consensus, and public diplomacy. Smart and public diplomacy require a smart Ministry of Foreign Affairs, resoluteness depends on national leaders but is limited by the five-year regime changes. Has there been a government in Korean history that came close to or showed potential for this?

▲ I believe no leader in Korea has possessed all five diplomatic capabilities I mentioned. However, President Roh Tae-woo demonstrated smart diplomacy by pursuing progressive foreign policy through northern diplomacy in the post-Cold War environment.

President Kim Dae-jung improved inter-Korean relations by persuading the US and China and creating a peaceful atmosphere with North Korea through the Sunshine Policy.

President Lee Myung-bak highlighted global green growth as an international agenda. Although inter-Korean relations have since frozen, President Moon Jae-in’s diplomacy connecting inter-Korean and US-North Korea relations during the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics is also an example of smart diplomacy.

As for principled and resolute diplomacy, President Syngman Rhee showed boldness by opposing the armistice agreement despite US pressure. President Park Chung-hee is another example; when the Nixon administration considered withdrawing US troops from Korea in the 1970s, he emphasized self-reliant defense and promoted the defense industry to strengthen national security.

President Roh Moo-hyun also exemplified resolute diplomacy by resisting the Bush administration’s demand to dispatch a combat division to Iraq, instead sending a non-combat brigade to Erbil and courageously voicing concerns about strategic flexibility and wartime operational control transfer.

However, it is difficult to find a president who succeeded in diplomacy based on national consensus. Authoritarian regimes conducted unilateral diplomacy without public consensus, and since democratization, only northern diplomacy under Roh Tae-woo, the 2000 inter-Korean summit under Kim Dae-jung, and the two inter-Korean summits in 2018 can be considered based on national consensus. Since democratization in 1989, national consensus diplomacy remains one of the most challenging tasks.

Public diplomacy is a new concept, first initiated during President Lee Myung-bak’s administration and continued under Presidents Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in, but it is too early to judge its success.

- There was an attempt to reform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the current government. What are the strengths and areas for improvement of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Can our diplomacy demonstrate the imagination to break historical inertia?

▲ I highly evaluate the individual competitiveness and capabilities of our government diplomats. However, I am critical of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy culture and organizational culture. Traditionally, the Ministry has been called the ROK-US alliance department or the four-power diplomacy department. I believe it has not yet escaped that framework. Of course, the US and neighboring great powers, especially China, are important diplomatic partners.

However, excessive focus on specific great powers makes creative diplomacy difficult. We need more balanced and imaginative, even radical diplomacy. Appropriate role division between the Blue House and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also required. The Blue House should coordinate and adjust foreign policy but not create and execute it. Policy formulation and execution should be done by the Ministry, while the Blue House ensures these policies align with the president’s goals and facilitates inter-ministerial consultations during implementation.

- How do you evaluate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reform during Minister Kang Kyung-wha’s tenure?

▲ There were achievements in changing the organization and gaining public support. Minister Kang also undeniably raised Korea’s international stature. Some criticized her as a mere figurehead for the Blue House, but personally, I think she fulfilled her role well and likely feels the same. It is also true that the Blue House National Security Office chief played a practical command role.

However, this is common in other countries as well. In the US, foreign policy is centered around the National Security Advisor. There is no absolute answer in such relationships. Cooperation and coordination are necessary in the process of pursuing and implementing foreign policy.

Moon Jung-in, Chairman of the Sejong Institute (left), and Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, in conversation. Photo by Kim Hyun-min kimhyun81@

- Lastly, if you had to define yourself in one word?

▲ The term ‘progressive realist.’ I am progressive in that I reject war and pursue peace. However, I am a realist who values practical and empirical approaches in realizing peace. This means not judging reality based on idealistic values but finding idealistic solutions suited to reality.

To do so, one must follow common sense and natural order. Common sense means meeting the universal knowledge and expectations of people living in the current era, and natural order means examining which choices are appropriate within the broad flow of history. This requires the attitude of empathy and perspective-taking, or yeokji-saji (易地思之).

◆ Moon Jung-in

Graduated from Yonsei University’s Department of Philosophy and earned master’s and doctoral degrees in political science from the University of Maryland. He has served as an associate professor at the University of Kentucky, professor at Duke University, and participated in the Korean American Political Science Association and the American Political Science Association, establishing himself as a US expert. Chairman Moon played a key role in designing the Sunshine Policy and Northeast Asia Prosperity Policy during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. Recognized for his expertise in both government and academia, he accompanied former President Kim Dae-jung to Pyongyang during the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. Under the Moon Jae-in administration, he served as a special advisor on unification, diplomacy, and security.

Compiled by Reporter Yoo In-ho

Transcription by Shin Ui-chan, Researcher at Global Strategy Cooperation Institute