[The Editors' Verdict] What the 2+2 Left Behind

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Office at the Korea Institute for National Unification

There was a 2+2 meeting between the heads of diplomacy and defense of South Korea and the United States. The broad framework of the U.S. foreign and security strategy and the outline of its policy toward the Korean Peninsula were revealed. The strategic symbolism of the first overseas visit route is significant, as it offers insight into the U.S. perspective on the situation, geopolitical scaling, and strategic moves. This raises concerns because the statements made by the two U.S. ministers suggest a potentially conflictual situation on the Korean Peninsula in the future.

First, the U.S. strategic scaling. The core of this visit is the encirclement of China through strengthening alliances. The Atlantic alliance, the Indo-Pacific front, and the South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance serve as the geopolitical strongholds and fronts of this encirclement. The ties connecting these fronts are the international order based on norms and the strengthening of allied capabilities. These two pillars form the encirclement front against China. Democracy, human rights, international law, and the restoration of alliances were placed at the forefront. Accordingly, the roles of alliances will be adjusted and strengthened.

The South Korea-U.S. alliance does not seem to be an exception. The U.S. repeatedly emphasized the alliance as a core axis of peace, security, and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. Forces Korea also stated that they will continue to play an important role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, leaving open the possibility that the ‘threats’ defined by the U.S. could be mobilized against China. The alliance was defined as being based on the values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Ultimately, joint responses to threats opposing these values and cooperation in encircling and pressuring China were presented as the values of the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

Thirdly, the emphasis on ‘deterrence.’ Through the joint statement and press conference, they mentioned ‘extended deterrence’ and strengthening the ‘alliance deterrence posture’ against ‘common threats.’ Although they did not specify who the deterrence is aimed at, it is clear that it is not only North Korea. To maintain deterrence, they promised to continue combined South Korea-U.S. military exercises, maintain the role of U.S. Forces Korea in regional peace and stability, and secure operational readiness and capabilities. The delay in the transfer of wartime operational control was also acknowledged as a fait accompli.

However, there is a critical point. For North Korea, this joint statement between South Korea and the U.S. could be read as an outright denial of the Singapore North Korea-U.S. agreement. It is unclear whether this oversight of such details is due to being overly focused on the China encirclement strategy, an initial exclusion of North Korea’s demands, or a refusal to inherit the Singapore agreement, but it contradicts existing North Korea-U.S. agreements. Lastly, there is disappointment in the remarks on North Korea’s nuclear issue. Although it is too early to make definitive judgments, the statements so far have been technical and peripheral. While North Korea seeks fundamental relationship improvement and a reciprocal approach, the U.S. still views North Korea through the technical choices of pressure and diplomacy. There is yet no visible shift or reflection commensurate with a ‘comprehensive review’ of North Korea policy.

The phrase “fully coordinated North Korea strategy” between South Korea and the U.S. also raises doubts. It is unclear whether this refers to close coordination reflecting alliance intentions or rhetoric to block South Korea’s independent actions. However, questions remain about whether complete coordination is truly possible or necessary. Since positions and national interests may differ, how can they be fully aligned? It is likely more productive to acknowledge and utilize certain differences.

The first overseas move of U.S. diplomacy and defense is too rough. It is aligned with the overarching China encirclement and pressure strategy. Individual bilateral and regional issues also seem to be fitted into the China strategy. The Korean Peninsula peace and North Korea nuclear issues appear modest compared to the emphasis placed on alliance strengthening for criticizing and encircling China. There was little delicacy or respect shown toward the issues that South Korea genuinely cares about. If our government does not respond with a more sophisticated and strategic plan, the likelihood of a conflictual confrontation in the future seems high.

Hong Min, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification