Former Defense Minister Perry: "North Korea Must Negotiate Based on Possession of Nuclear Weapons"

[Asia Economy Reporter Kim Dong-pyo] Former key figures in North Korean nuclear negotiations gathered in one place to share their experiences dealing with North Korea and offer advice for successful negotiations.

The National Security Strategy Institute held an international conference titled "Understanding North Korea - Sharing Experiences of Inter-Korean Negotiations and Exchanges" via video conference on the 2nd at The Plaza Hotel in Jung-gu.

First, William Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration who led the thaw in U.S.-North Korea relations, stated that making North Korea’s denuclearization the negotiation goal is impossible.

He said, "My advice to future negotiators is that if you want to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, fundamentally this could be a 'mission impossible.' North Korea wants economic development but will not trade it for nuclear weapons."

Former Secretary Perry added, "That does not mean negotiations are unnecessary. Negotiations must be based on the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, and negotiations should aim for North Korea’s normalization as a state."

He particularly noted that in the process of North Korea becoming a normal state, "South Korea will play an important role in North Korea’s economic development."

On the other hand, Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. State Department special envoy for North Korea negotiations, said that resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement) is possible.

DeTrani, who served in the George W. Bush administration, argued, "It will take a long time, and the Libya model (denuclearization first, then economic rewards) will not work, but CVID is a feasible approach."

Reflecting on his negotiation experience, he said, "North Korea sees the U.S. as the party demanding regime change and wants security guarantees from the U.S. North Korea desires normalization of relations with the U.S."

Robert Gallucci, former U.S. State Department special envoy on North Korea, introduced North Korea’s unique negotiation style.

He said, "North Korea initially appears stubborn, but over time they take a step back and engage in 'give and take,' which was surprising."

He also explained, "North Korea sees itself as the 'underdog' while viewing the U.S. as a superpower and believes that behind everything?the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?there is the U.S. They wondered why they should talk with the South when they can talk to the world’s hegemon (the U.S.), which seemed to cause resistance to inter-Korean dialogue."

Lim Dong-won, former Minister of Unification and a key figure in the June 15, 2000 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration, emphasized the importance of accurate information in negotiations and shared his experience visiting Pyongyang in May 2000 as a special envoy of former President Kim Dae-jung.

Lim said, "Most of the information reported domestically about Kim Jong-il was negative, such as 'his words and actions are like a rugby ball, unpredictable,' and 'he has a speech disorder and cannot speak properly.' I was sent as a special envoy to Pyongyang with the mission from President Kim to meet Chairman Kim Jong-il and obtain accurate information."

He stressed, "Negotiation strategies or techniques are not the main issue. If there is political will and determination to make policy decisions and agreements, negotiations progress rapidly."