[Takryucheongron] The 'Second Moon Hee-sang Proposal' Must Open the Way for Korea-Japan Negotiations

Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is exceptional in many aspects of Japanese politics. Until now, no prime minister from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has come from a non-faction background. There has never been a case where a Chief Cabinet Secretary suddenly became prime minister due to a sudden resignation. Nor has there been a city-born lawmaker representing local interests. Nevertheless, the background that allowed Prime Minister Suga to emerge includes factors such as the end of the faction coalition within the LDP, the shift from bureaucratic-led to residence-led governance, local backlash against Tokyo centralization, and a sense of crisis regarding the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

Unlike former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister Suga is a thorough realist. He is a person without ideology or dogma, unbound by ideology or beliefs. Within the LDP’s ideological lineage, there are two main currents: the strong conservative "Sewakai," symbolized by former Prime Minister Abe, and the liberal "Kochikai," led by former Secretary-General Fumio Kishida. Between them exists the "interest-seeking" Takeshita faction. Prime Minister Suga is a pragmatic operator distinct from these ideological tendencies within the LDP factions.

One of Prime Minister Suga’s strengths is that he is a "cool-headed realist" with decisiveness and patience. For example, during the 1998 post-Hashimoto Ryutaro presidential election, Suga gained a reputation as a politician with loyalty and courage by supporting Seiroku Kagiayama instead of the easier path. In the 2012 presidential election, he supported former Prime Minister Abe, showing his realist side. The evaluation from Japan’s Nagatacho (political circles) that "Prime Minister Suga is someone who, once he decides to do something, definitely accomplishes it and has real tenacity" reveals his true character.

It is questionable whether realist Prime Minister Suga will apply his practical sense to improving Japan-South Korea relations. Unfortunately, the saying "Former Prime Minister Abe was difficult because of his convictions, and Prime Minister Suga is difficult because he is strategic" is proving true. Currently, Prime Minister Suga’s priority is domestic policy. He aims to increase political support through successful COVID-19 response. He is also strongly motivated to stabilize the administration through elections. In fact, while Prime Minister Suga presents concrete policy alternatives domestically, his foreign policy lacks specificity. Notably, he did not mention Japan-South Korea relations at all during his first press conference as prime minister, indicating a low policy priority. Even after a recent telephone talk with President Moon Jae-in, he emphasized "maintaining existing principles" during the press conference.

Considering this situation, the Suga administration’s diplomacy toward South Korea is likely to be "passive diplomacy" that reacts according to South Korea’s response. Alternatively, depending on Japan’s political situation, Prime Minister Suga may prioritize consolidating domestic conservative support and strengthening the administration’s foundation by insisting on a hardline stance. It is clear that the likelihood of Prime Minister Suga actively pursuing improvement in Japan-South Korea relations in the near future is very low.

Improving Japan-South Korea relations should not rely solely on changes in Japan. It is important to keep in mind that the direction of Japan-South Korea relations can also be determined by South Korea’s choices. From now on, the choices of the Moon Jae-in administration are crucial. The first choice is to take the birth of Prime Minister Suga as an opportunity to improve Japan-South Korea relations and actively work on solutions for compensation related to forced labor. To this end, proposing a "second Moon Hee-sang" bill in the National Assembly to open the way for negotiations between the two governments is one method. Japan should also be able to present compromise proposals in response to South Korea’s efforts. The second choice is a passive policy of managing Japan-South Korea relations. For now, dialogue between the two leaders is essential to prevent deterioration of relations. Furthermore, the upcoming trilateral summit among South Korea, China, and Japan within the year should serve as an opportunity for substantive dialogue between the leaders of Japan and South Korea. The Blue House and the Japanese Prime Minister’s residence must also communicate actively. The third choice is maintaining the status quo, which, due to various factors, risks failure in managing Japan-South Korea relations and leads to the worst-case scenario. Even now, the Moon Jae-in administration must have a sense of crisis regarding Japan-South Korea relations and approach Japan policy strategically rather than emotionally.

Jin Chang-su, Senior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute