[Opinion] The New Four Years of the United States Will Determine the International Order

Professor Jaeho Hwang, School of International Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

In mid-June 2016, shortly after Donald Trump was nominated as the Republican candidate for the U.S. presidential election, I contributed an editorial to a domestic daily newspaper forecasting U.S.-China relations. In summary, “Trump’s ‘America First’ policy is more beneficial than harmful to China. First, the illusion of the American system has been shattered. Instead, the Chinese-style leadership training system appears more plausible. Second, Trump’s unpredictability will cover up the weaknesses and mistakes of Xi Jinping’s diplomacy. Compared to the calculating Trump, Xi Jinping appears more serious, creating an optical illusion. Ultimately, this helps create an environment conducive to establishing a new Chinese order. Third, South Korea is not a first-tier ally to the U.S. If South Korea free-rides on security while showing economic goodwill, the alliance will not be shaken, but the logic of ‘security with the U.S. despite economic ties with China’ (Anmi Gyeongjung, 安美經中) will lose strength. The influx of materialistic elements will affect the value of the Korea-U.S. alliance.”

Looking back now, this largely aligns with the current U.S.-China relationship, but I was overly focused on Trump’s style and did not sufficiently pay attention to the fundamental changes in U.S. China policy after 2017. Now, watching the U.S. presidential election again, I interpret the meaning of the next four years. If Trump shook the existing international political landscape significantly over the past four years, the next four years?whether Trump is re-elected or Biden does not deviate much from Trump’s policies?could overturn the entire framework.

The key points to watch are, first, whether U.S. domestic politics will show the exemplary behavior we expect. Over the past four years, the personalization of the presidential system and extreme partisan conflicts in Congress have been severe. On top of this, the increasing possibility of Trump rejecting mail-in ballots in the election suggests significant post-election aftereffects. To make matters worse, after the death of a progressive-leaning Supreme Court justice, Trump’s right to nominate a replacement justice is expected to cause rigidity in the judiciary. If the U.S. value and system superiority, seemingly perfect based on the separation of powers, is seriously shaken, the U.S. will be perceived more quickly as just one of many ‘ordinary’ great powers.

Second, whether the U.S. will return to traditional global leadership. The U.S. still holds more power and credibility than any other country, but it remains to be seen whether it will continue its role as the world’s policeman, maintain trade and investment openness, and prioritize alliances. In the next four years, the U.S. will attempt to dismantle and rebuild the order it previously established, but if it does not remain faithful to the fundamentals and principles of the free and prosperous international order and does not move beyond prioritizing U.S. national interests, the decline of U.S. global influence is inevitable. If Trump is re-elected, the elegance of U.S. diplomacy will completely disappear. If Biden’s rhetoric is diplomatic but he follows Trump’s policies, it may be better to give up hope for U.S. leadership.

Third, whether the U.S. will concretize its China-targeted Indo-Pacific strategy. Although the term ‘new Cold War’ is used, complete decoupling is difficult due to the extensive economic interdependence between the U.S. and China. However, as the power gap between the two narrows, whether under Trump or Biden, the goal and intention of U.S. China policy remain the same: to bring China to its knees, though the means and methods may differ. The Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially military in nature, but many new concepts have been devised in addition, such as the Economic Prosperity Network (EPN) in the economic sphere, the D10 group of ten democratic countries in diplomacy, the Five Eyes in intelligence, and Quad Plus in pandemic response. For the Indo-Pacific strategy to succeed over the next four years, enormous budgets and full participation of allies in the anti-China front are prerequisites. If the U.S. does not fund it directly, the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy will be very slow and fraught with difficulties.

Then, what about our policy toward the U.S.? South Korea, which has long held the position of ‘security with the U.S., economy with China,’ faces a dilemma again. The U.S. invites South Korea to the G11 and demands active participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, there is no need for us to be the first among allies to express support or opposition to U.S. demands. Realistically, no matter what we do, we cannot become an ally on par with Japan or the U.K. Other U.S. allies are not as directly exposed to China’s ‘threat’ geographically, economically, and in terms of security as we are. In a situation where the U.S. does not intervene directly and allies with shared difficulties or middle powers cannot even voice their opinions, our choices will inevitably lag behind. The next four years will be a time for setting our coordinates and practicing selective diplomacy to do our best to avoid the worst.

Hwang Jae-ho, Professor, Department of International Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies