[The Editors' Verdict] For a Korean Peninsula Model of Cooperative Security

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification

The statement released on July 10 by Kim Yo-jong, First Deputy Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, is 'groundbreaking' both in content and form. It candidly acknowledged the strategic failure of the Hanoi North Korea?U.S. summit. Learning from that, it clearly presented their demands for negotiations with the U.S. This statement focused on expressing their position as clearly as possible. It is a call to recognize their expectations and stance. In fact, it can be seen as an 'invitation to the final negotiation' sent to the Donald Trump administration.

The main point conveyed is this: negotiations are possible only if the U.S. makes a significant change in attitude. First, there must be a 'withdrawal of hostile policy' before sitting at the negotiation table. This adds one more 'threshold' compared to before Hanoi. Subsequent negotiations and agreements involve the simultaneous exchange of 'irreversible major measures,' that is, a phased exchange of 'denuclearization vs. security guarantees.' Here, 'security guarantees' in North Korea's terms means the 'withdrawal of hostile policies toward Korea.' Although 'withdrawal of hostile policy' appears both as a threshold and in the main negotiation, the level differs.

The 'withdrawal of hostility' required to enter negotiations includes suspension of South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, halting additional U.S. sanctions against North Korea, removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and cessation of human rights issues. On the other hand, the 'withdrawal of hostile policy' to be exchanged in the main negotiation includes suspension of deployment of strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula, changes in U.S. nuclear policy designating North Korea as a preemptive nuclear strike target, halting introduction and import of weapons to the Peninsula, permanent suspension or reduction/alteration of South Korea-U.S. joint exercises, normalization of North Korea?U.S. relations, signing of a peace agreement, and lifting of sanctions. The core of the hostile policy North Korea demands to be withdrawn is the elimination of 'military threats.' They are saying that as they denuclearize, the military threats directed at them must be removed.

Ultimately, North Korea's denuclearization issue has limitations in negotiation entry, agreement, and implementation if approached solely within the framework of 'denuclearization.' A structure is needed in which security guarantees commensurate with denuclearization are exchanged mutually and equivalently within the same framework, ensuring the safety of all parties involved. In other words, an approach centered on 'mutual security guarantees,' 'cooperative threat reduction,' and 'institutionalization of peace' for all parties is necessary. Rather than focusing solely on North Korea's 'denuclearization' as a prerequisite, a gradual approach that practically reduces overall military threats, including nuclear threats, may be more realistic.

South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. should set denuclearization as a common goal, but the process requires a long-term perspective involving gradual or partial nuclear threat reduction over a considerable period, alongside conventional weapons threats and the institutionalization of peace in stages. The essence lies in 'mutual security guarantees,' focusing on how to ensure mutual safety by gradually reducing nuclear and conventional weapon threats to the extent possible, thereby enhancing the level of mutual security guarantees.

Through such phased mutual security guarantees and threat reduction, it is necessary to consider a realistic peace process that produces the effects of denuclearization even before 'complete denuclearization.' The key is for South and North Korea and surrounding major powers to design and agree on a comprehensive 'cooperative transition program' that guarantees mutual security and reduces threats starting from what is feasible. The approach of reducing overall military threats, including nuclear threats, at a realistic level has lacked problem-solving capacity due to the inefficiency of negotiation frameworks that decide everything based on acceptance and precedence of 'denuclearization.'

Instead of taking 'denuclearization' as the sole starting point, it is necessary to conceptualize a concrete program that positions denuclearization within the dimension of 'mutual security guarantees' and reduces threats step-by-step through linkage with other security guarantee issues. In the dimension of 'mutual security guarantees,' nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and peace institutionalization should interlock at feasible levels, and building 'trust' gradually should be the core of this program.

Hong Min, Director of North Korea Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification