[Lee Jong-gil's Autumn Return] If War Breaks Out in the Future, Will the Battlefield Be Asia?

Lawrence Freedman, Authority on War Studies and Military Strategy, on 'The Future of War'
From Past Wars to Future Predictions... Preemptive Strikes and New Technologies Do Not Guarantee Victory
War Perception Becomes More Cautious with Nuclear Weapons Development... Focus Shifts to Preventing Nuclear Development Itself
"Asia Has a High Potential to Become a Great Power War Stage When Combined with Regional Political Complexity"

Prolonged wars entail significant sacrifices and devastation. Strategists have focused on swift victories to minimize losses. They mobilized all resources to launch surprise attacks. It was believed that the initial strike had to be decisive to avoid a long and arduous battle.

Historically, such battles have been treated as important. Victory is never guaranteed. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor inflicted heavy damage on their opponents but ultimately resulted in greater defeats. However, these two operations are more often cited as examples of how complacency can lead to downfall.

In fact, surprise attacks were carried out several times even after World War II ended. Examples include North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, Argentina's occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1982, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. All parties that initiated these wars failed to achieve their objectives.

Lawrence Freedman, a world authority in war studies and military strategy, argues in his book The Future of War that the conventional notion of surprise attacks still persists. He points out a tendency to focus on the decisive initial phase while neglecting the harsher consequences that follow in subsequent phases.

This is closely related to the development of new technologies. While embracing new possibilities, other possibilities are often closed off. However, technology is difficult to monopolize, and methods to limit its effects continue to emerge. This is why modern Western militaries, despite promoting the illusion of war through astonishing technology, still face slow, harsh, and inconclusive wars.

General Herbert Raymond McMaster, former U.S. National Security Advisor, described such failures as the "vampire error." This meant that overlooked aspects in war scenarios pop up like undying vampires. Freedman also warns against obsession with new weapons or optimistic views of victory.

"New concepts with alluring names promised low-cost, rapid, and efficient victories in future wars. Skeptics were dismissed as stuck in old mindsets. The idea was to see first, decide first, act first, and end decisively. The error lay in ignoring the political and human dimensions of war and equating goal-setting with tactics, operations, and strategy. It failed to recognize the uncertainty of war, which is constantly altered by firm and cunning interactions with an elusive enemy."

Recently, perceptions of war have become more cautious due to the development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons ended World War II with overwhelming power. As sophisticated weapons capable of mass slaughter were developed, wars became more brutal. Consequently, some world leaders have acted cautiously even in the face of minor crises.

To quote the slogan shared by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan and former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev: "A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought."

Nuclear war appeared as a natural extension of previous conventional wars. Now, there seems to be no connection between the two types. Conventional wars often adopt strategies to avoid harming civilians. In contrast, nuclear weapons tend to be seen as deterrents against extreme actions by other countries. However, attitudes can change under the pressure of war.

Countries with conventional forces far behind the U.S. seem to regard nuclear weapons as an absolute balancing factor. In fact, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in 2014, tried to dissuade the U.S. from acting on behalf of Ukraine by saying, "Fortunately, I think no one wants to enter into a large-scale conflict with Russia. Remember that Russia is one of the major nuclear powers."

The nuclear weapons caution of great powers has triggered a new dimension of war. The U.S. and its allies went to war to disrupt Iraq's future nuclear program. More recently, they have sought to stop North Korea from advancing its already developed nuclear and missile programs, even at the risk of nuclear retaliation.

The author wrote, "Because nuclear weapons are objects of fear, they are both bad and help one side gain an advantage. Whether they will be used again in anger, and if so, when, will influence all future discussions about war."

At the center of this is the United States. Since the end of World War II, it has taken on the role of a kind of international order guardian. Its allies make considerable efforts to track and review security debates within the U.S. government and assess how much they can rely on U.S. support in times of crisis.

The author poses another question about this trend: "Will the U.S. continue to enjoy military superiority?" The U.S. is the only major power capable of waging wars worldwide with conventional forces. However, it can no longer be assumed to achieve clear victories. This could emerge as a frightening scenario on the divided Korean Peninsula, especially if conventional notions of surprise attacks remain unchanged.

"The U.S. military has long expected serious threats from the air or to lose ships in naval confrontations. Russia will pose serious threats but is unlikely to develop into a stronger country due to economic weaknesses. China is expected to become stronger as long as it maintains internal stability. Therefore, Asia, combined with the complexity of regional politics, is more likely to become the stage for future great power wars."