[Yang Nak-gyu's Defense Club] Conflict with UN Command Even After Wartime OPCON Transfer?

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu Reporter] Concerns are emerging that conflicts may continue in the future regarding the transfer of wartime operational control between our military and the United Nations (UN) Command. The UN Command's unusual announcement of investigation results on the shooting incident at the Central Front Guard Post (GP), which contradicted those of our military, is seen as merely a prelude to conflict.

On the morning of the 3rd, North Korean forces fired four rounds of 14.5mm anti-aircraft gun bullets toward our military's GP at the Central Front GP. In response, our military fired about 30 rounds with K-3 light machine guns and K-6 medium machine guns targeting the North Korean post presumed to be the origin of the fire.

The UN multinational investigation team, along with Swedish and Swiss personnel from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, conducted an on-site inspection at the shooting location on the 4th, the day after the GP shooting incident. Since North Korean forces did not cooperate with the investigation, only a partial inspection was conducted. On the afternoon of the 26th, 22 days after the investigation, the UN Command issued a press release concluding that "both South and North Korean sides violated the armistice agreement in the shooting incident at the DMZ guard posts." Regardless of intent or accident, any firing across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) constitutes a violation of the armistice agreement.

In particular, the UN Command explained that it "could not definitively determine whether the four shots fired by North Korean forces at the South Korean GP were intentional or accidental." Previously, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff had judged the incident as an accidental shooting by North Korean forces based on overall information. This contrasts with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's statement that the shooting was accidental, drawing attention.

Our military expressed regret over the UN Command's investigation results, stating, "We regret the announcement made without substantive measures." This is the first time our military has expressed regret over the UN Command's investigation results.

This has been interpreted as the long-standing resentment between our military and the UN Command surfacing. The UN Command, which holds authority over DMZ access and Military Demarcation Line passage, has repeatedly interfered in inter-Korean relations, causing friction and dissatisfaction from our government.

In August 2018, the UN Command denied passage of South Korean personnel, materials, and equipment across the Military Demarcation Line, causing the collapse of a joint inter-Korean railway survey. The official reason was failure to apply 48 hours in advance. However, since then, a subtle "tension" has developed between the government and the UN Command.

In October last year, Minister of Unification Kim Yeon-chul indirectly expressed dissatisfaction with the UN Command's authority over access control at the National Assembly, stating, "There should be institutional improvements regarding non-military, unarmed access." Former Presidential Chief of Staff Im Jong-seok also openly criticized the UN Command in a 2020 summer issue interview of "Changjakgwa Bipyeong" on the 20th anniversary of the June 15th Joint Declaration, saying, "(The UN Command) tries to exercise unreasonable overreach."

The issue remains ongoing. The UN Command Commander, who concurrently serves as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, is responsible only for armistice-related duties such as operating the Military Armistice Commission in peacetime, managing the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, guarding the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, operating DMZ guard posts, and holding general-level talks with North Korea. The U.S. side insists that even after the transfer of wartime operational control, the UN Commander should be able to issue operational orders to our military in case of peacetime military crises. In the "second half combined command post exercise" in August last year, when the transfer of operational control was verified, the U.S. Forces Korea's attempt to expand the UN Command's authority sparked controversy.

Additionally, the U.S. side is reportedly hoping to include Japan in the UN Command's staff organization as a "UN Command contributing country" after the transfer of operational control. This is based on the argument that if North Korean ballistic missiles target U.S. reinforcement forces departing from U.S. bases in Japan or Japan itself, Japan Self-Defense Forces should also respond. Our military holds the position that Japan cannot act as a "UN Command contributing country" because it was not a participant in the Korean War.

Our military points out that such U.S. demands could infringe upon the authority of the future Combined Forces Command (CFC) Commander (a South Korean general) after the transfer of wartime operational control. Once operational control is transferred to our military, the future CFC Commander, a South Korean general, will exercise operational control in both wartime and peacetime. The U.S. general commanding U.S. Forces Korea will serve as deputy commander. However, if after the transfer the U.S. Forces Korea Commander concurrently assumes the expanded authority of the UN Command Commander, the command relationship with the South Korean commander could become ambiguous.