[Yang Nak-gyu's Defense Club] Three Unresolved Questions About the GP Shooting

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu Reporter] The military announced the verification results on the shooting incident at the North Korean army’s Guard Post (GP) within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the 3rd, but doubts remain unresolved. The issues include ▲ the premature conclusion that North Korea’s shooting was accidental ▲ the uselessness argument regarding the violation of the September 19 Military Agreement ▲ poor management of the K-6 machine gun Remote Controlled Weapon System (RCWS).

According to the military’s verification results on the 14th, "Considering that visibility was only 0.5 to 1 km due to thick fog on the day of the shooting and it was shift change time, it is judged to be an accidental firing." The military authorities have been asserting since the day of the shooting that it was an accidental shot by the North Korean army.

However, four bullets from the North Korean army’s high-velocity rifle were found within a 1 to 2-meter range on the left and right walls of our GP observation post. This means that the North side fired with precise aim at our GP observation post. Both South and North Korea usually fix weapons deployed at GPs toward forward targets. This is to ensure accurate hits on the opposing side’s GP even in poor visibility or at night. If the shooting had been accidental as the military claims, the North would have already judged that they hit our GP and should have notified that it was an accidental shot. However, the North remains silent.

North Korea also fired shots toward the 15th Army Division in Hwacheon, Gangwon Province, on October 29, 2010. Just three hours before the shooting, North Korea threatened "merciless physical retaliation," saying, "You will realize how grave the catastrophic consequences of the breakdown in inter-Korean relations caused by (South Korea’s) refusal to hold military working-level talks are," after South Korea rejected North Korea’s proposal for military talks. Notably, this was the day before the reunion of separated families. At that time, the Ministry of National Defense interpreted the shooting as unintentional, which also sparked controversy.

Some suggest that the Blue House instructed not to disclose the facts from the early stages of the incident and ordered the military to emphasize the possibility of accidental firing. It is also known that the Blue House instructed to include the term "nearby" during last year’s North Korean small boat incident.

As North Korea continues provocations, there are criticisms that the "September 19 Military Agreement" has become practically meaningless. Even with frontline shooting incidents, there have been no protests from our side or explanations from North Korea, turning the agreement into a "promise that neither side needs to keep."

North Korea has followed a pattern of "disappearance → public appearance → provocation." Chairman Kim disappeared for 13 days in July 2017 before test-firing the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). After the September 19 Military Agreement, in October last year, Kim did not appear publicly for over two weeks before directly ordering coastal artillery fire at the Changrindo defense unit in the western frontline of the inter-Korean border in November. Our military’s passive stance has also been controversial. North Korea launched short-range projectiles repeatedly in February. Although this violated UN Security Council resolutions, North Korea claimed it was "just internal training." Our government did not take strong action. Ultimately, violations of the September 19 Military Agreement have fizzled out without sanctions or explanations from the North.

The problem will continue. Our military loudly promoted in 2016 the completion of a remote firing control system for frontline GPs and General Outposts (GOPs). It was said that enemy movements at long distances, difficult to identify with the naked eye, could be monitored day and night from our outpost control rooms, and when the enemy provokes, firing could be remotely controlled from the control room. It was also explained that the firing control system would enhance the survival rate of our soldiers and the accuracy of firing.

However, in this response shooting, the firing control system’s barrel burst and did not operate. Three attempts at counter-fire were useless. The military emphasized that considering the time taken to install and aim a newly installed K-6 medium machine gun instead of the broken firing control system, the response was not late. The criticism arises: "In urgent situations such as wartime, if quick counter-fire is not possible, is it acceptable to justify the response by using other methods?"