[The Editors' Verdict] The Path to North Korea's Normalization After COVID-19

Young-gi Cho, Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of Political Science, Kookmin University · Chairman of the Advanced Unification Research Association, Hanseon Foundation

April is the season of politics in North Korea. Around April 15, Kim Il-sung's birthday (Day of the Sun), important political messages are delivered, and the Supreme People's Assembly, which supports domestic and foreign policy decisions, is held. However, the political landscape of North Korea in April 2020 is unusually different from previous years. Political events in April have disappeared, focusing solely on minimizing the impact of the novel coronavirus infection (COVID-19). In short, it consistently shows a defensive stance aimed at managing the crisis situation caused by COVID-19.

The April political events proceeded with the Workers' Party Political Bureau meeting (April 11), followed by the Supreme People's Assembly the next day (April 12), and then a quiet Day of the Sun event (April 15). The procedure from the Political Bureau meeting to the Supreme People's Assembly demonstrates that the party-centered governance system?where the party decides, the Supreme People's Assembly ratifies, and the State Affairs Commission and Cabinet execute?has been institutionally established. Meanwhile, the decisions of these two major meetings largely reflect a pragmatic response to minimize domestic and international risks triggered by COVID-19. In particular, attention should be paid to the 'Joint Decision' by the Party Central Committee, State Affairs Commission, and Cabinet. The Joint Decision took measures such as postponing, reducing, and downwardly adjusting various economic plan targets that were planned at the end of last year, thereby reprioritizing. It is also noteworthy that the decision selected 'continued strengthening of the national emergency epidemic prevention work' as the top priority.

The reason North Korea has placed COVID-19 epidemic prevention work as the highest priority in state governance is multifaceted. First, COVID-19 prevention is seen as directly linked to Kim Jong-un's leadership. The spread of the epidemic could act as a signal of public discontent toward Kim Jong-un. Additionally, there is a realistic judgment that North Korea's economic activities will inevitably shrink due to the global economic crisis caused by COVID-19, the downturn of the Chinese economy, the persistence of economic sanctions against North Korea, and the closure of the North Korea-China border. This is a calculated concern about the backlash that would occur if North Korea were to 'break through head-on' with large-scale national construction projects planned before COVID-19. The postponement of the completion ceremony for the 'Wonsan-Galma Tourist Zone,' timed with Kim Il-sung's birthday, is in the same context.

That said, considering the current economic crisis in North Korea even after COVID-19, recovery does not seem easy. COVID-19 has dealt a severe blow to the vulnerable North Korean economy, and there is little possibility that economic sanctions against North Korea will be lifted or eased. This is because the root cause of North Korea's economic crisis lies in the inefficiency of its economic system. It is well known that this inefficiency has triggered a structural, cumulative, and long-term economic crisis. However, through the April political events, North Korea remained lukewarm in addressing the root causes of the economic crisis rather than taking fundamental measures.

At the Supreme People's Assembly, as a last resort, the 'Re-Resource Law' was enacted, forcing sacrifices from the people. The enactment of the 'Re-Resource Law' is an inevitable product of maintaining the status quo amid a situation where foreign currency earning outlets such as labor dispatch and coal exports are almost blocked due to economic sanctions, making imports difficult. This re-resource effort appears to be part of a policy to achieve economic growth through self-reliance, even if it means tightening belts. However, it is bittersweet as it seems like a d?j? vu of the 1984 '8.3 People's Consumer Goods Movement,' which aimed to produce and supply daily necessities using by-products and waste materials. Therefore, it is clear that ignoring systemic problems and pushing 're-resource' will not solve either livelihood issues or economic development problems.

Livelihood issues have long been a persistent challenge in North Korea. Even after COVID-19, livelihood problems will continue until fundamental changes occur. Therefore, the immediate task is to turn the COVID-19 crisis into an opportunity for fundamental change in North Korea. Only then can the path to North Korea's normalization be found, and a step closer be taken toward peaceful reunification.