[In-Depth Look] Cards to Pay Less and Push More

Professor Jaeho Hwang, Department of International Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper jointly contributed an op-ed titled "South Korea Is an Ally, Not a Welfare Recipient" to the Wall Street Journal on the 16th (local time). The main point of the article is that South Korea, as an equal partner in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and a wealthy nation, should contribute more to its defense. U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris also stated at a meeting on the 16th that if South Korea intends to pursue inter-Korean cooperation independently, it must discuss with the U.S. in advance to avoid misunderstandings about evading sanctions against North Korea. High-ranking U.S. officials have launched comprehensive challenges regarding South Korea's increase in defense cost-sharing and North Korea policy. So, can we pay less and push harder?

Ambassador Harris’s mention of possible sanctions when the Moon Jae-in administration pursued inter-Korean cooperation was perceived as 'interference in sovereignty.' He is merely implementing the values of U.S. President Donald Trump as they are. Rather, he is a helpful (?) person who accurately reveals the thoughts of the Trump administration and the U.S. Therefore, they are merely the vanguard of America First ideology, and no matter how much we criticize them, nothing will change. They are one team. The mention in the op-ed of the U.S. contribution to South Korea’s defense, including advanced military capabilities, now implies that South Korea must pay royalties not only for tangible but also intangible 'security' intellectual property. President Trump said on Fox News on the 10th that South Korea "will pay more." This pressure will continue beyond election purposes throughout his next term.

What the U.S. wants South Korea to do as an ally is stated in the op-ed: "If South Korea bears more costs, we will ensure that the (U.S.-South Korea) alliance remains the linchpin of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and around the world." For Trump, purchasing advanced weapons is already a given, with defense cost-sharing and dispatching troops to the Strait of Hormuz added on. Meanwhile, what South Korea wants the U.S. to do as an ally is exactly what the op-ed says: to guarantee South Korea’s efforts for peace and prosperity worldwide, in Northeast Asia, and on the Korean Peninsula. This means partially guaranteeing inter-Korean cooperation within the framework of international sanctions for denuclearization. The Pompeo-Esper op-ed can be resolved by paying more money, but the problem lies in Ambassador Harris’s remarks. Whether they are linked is unknown, but from South Korea’s perspective, it would be best to pay less and still have inter-Korean cooperation possible.

Since the 16th, several scenarios can be considered for the development of U.S.-South Korea relations. First, South Korea pays more, but the U.S. does not allow inter-Korean cooperation, which is the most realistic. Second, South Korea neither pays more nor does the U.S. allow cooperation, but South Korea cannot afford not to pay. Third, South Korea pays more and the U.S. allows cooperation. However, this is only possible if Trump is confident of reciprocal benefits. A concerning point is that defense cost-sharing and North Korea policy are separate issues for the U.S. Our position and the U.S. position may differ. Can we really enforce our will on the U.S.? The reason the U.S. did not escalate to full-scale war despite assassinating an Iranian military commander in a decapitation operation is due to concerns over Iran’s retaliatory capabilities. The trade truce with China was also because China’s economic power could influence Trump’s support base. That is why a compromise was made. South Korea is an ally of the U.S. But does Trump have a 'one-shot' reason to allow inter-Korean cooperation? Does South Korea have cards to use as leverage with the U.S.? If the U.S. does not allow inter-Korean cooperation, will we settle for second-best benefits and compromise? Will we exchange it for wartime operational control or the Indo-Pacific strategy?

President Moon witnessed the influence of the U.S. on inter-Korean issues firsthand during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Because of that, he handled consultations with the U.S. "as if handling a fragile glass" from the start of his administration. However, to somehow nurture the seeds of peace that have barely sprouted over the past two years, this time we must definitely cross the threshold. It is not "many blessings bring many troubles" (好事多魔) but "many troubles bring blessings" (多魔好事); there is opportunity in crisis.