[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu Reporter] As the possibility of North Korean provocations increases this year, attention is focused on what form these provocations might take. North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un mentioned "new strategic weapons" and "shocking actions" at last year's Workers' Party plenary meeting, indicating that the possibility of provocations remains high.
Inside and outside the military, it is expected that if North Korea provokes, three scenarios are possible: ▲low-intensity provocations mindful of international backlash ▲high-intensity provocations such as the launch of strategic weapons, which are means of transporting nuclear weapons, and the 7th nuclear test.
It has been identified that North Korea is increasing the number of long-range artillery units deployed in the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Corps at the front lines in preparation for winter training. The 5th Corps, responsible for the central front line in the North, recently conducted live-fire exercises with its artillery units. The military evaluates this as routine winter training, but provocations disguised as winter training are also possible. Along with the 5th Corps, the 2nd Corps responsible for the central front and the 1st Corps responsible for the western front have increased the number of long-range artillery inside tunnels, deploying around 100 artillery pieces.
Provocations in the West Sea are also possible. It is known that North Korea has maintained coastal artillery and artillery units in the West Sea buffer zone even after the September 19 military agreement. The North Korean coastal artillery in this area numbers about 250 pieces, five times more than South Korea's, and about 400 artillery pieces, three times more than South Korea's, all aimed precisely at the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. In November last year, North Korea fired coastal artillery from Changrindo into the West Sea, sparking controversy over violating the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement. Following Chairman Kim's instructions, since 2015, North Korea has militarized five uninhabited islands in the West Sea, including Mudo, Jangjaedo, Galdo, Arido, and Hambakdo.
High-intensity provocations are also mentioned as a possible scenario. The strategic weapons referred to by North Korea mean mobile means capable of carrying nuclear weapons. These include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). North Korea refers to SLBMs as "underwater strategic ballistic missiles."
North Korea may test-launch an upgraded version of the "Pukguksong-3" SLBM, developed for multiple warheads and nuclear warheads, or reveal a submarine equipped with SLBMs. North Korea's state media released photos on July 23 last year showing Chairman Kim inspecting a new submarine over 3,000 tons at the Sinpo shipyard. This submarine is a strategic submarine equipped with 2 to 3 SLBMs and is evaluated to be capable of continuous SLBM launches as early as the first half of this year.
North Korea's ICBM development is expected to accelerate further. It may test a new engine that is an improved version of the "Baekdusan engine" used in the Hwasong-14 and 15 models to publicly announce the development of multiple warhead ICBMs domestically and internationally. Development to replace the ICBM's fuel from liquid to solid may also be accelerated. Using solid fuel in ICBMs eliminates the need for fueling procedures, enabling immediate launch. Currently, the Hwasong-14 and 15 models require about 30 minutes to fuel with liquid, making them easily exposed to South Korea-U.S. surveillance networks, a vulnerability that could be addressed.
Although less likely, a 7th nuclear test could also be carried out. Some speculate that even without conducting a nuclear test, movements to manufacture nuclear weapons will continue. North Korea dismantled five nuclear facilities under the 1994 North Korea-U.S. Geneva Agreement and three nuclear facilities under the 2008 Six-Party Talks results. However, 11 facilities still remain. These include nuclear power plants, research reactors (Yeongbyeon in Pyongyangbuk-do), uranium enrichment plants (Pyeongsan and Bakcheon in Hwangbuk, North Pyongan Province), and uranium mines (Pyeongsan in Hwangbuk and Sunchon in Pyongnam). Even without nuclear tests, the amount of materials necessary for nuclear weapons can be sufficiently increased.
Professor Kim Dong-yeop of the Far East Institute at Gyeongnam University said, "The new strategic weapons will not be shown in a short time to leave room for dialogue with the U.S.," adding, "They will continue provocations disguised as winter training or movements to increase nuclear materials."
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